Skip to main content

Conclusions

  • Chapter
Schools of Thought

Part of the book series: Sociology of the Sciences Monographs ((SOSM,volume 6))

  • 128 Accesses

Abstract

The manner in which scientists respond to the discovery of empirical anomalies has been at the center of philosophical controversies about the process of scientific development. Popper’s logic of scientific discovery, based on the methodology of falsification, requires that the search for anomalies, for discrepancies between observational statements and theoretical predictions, constitute the primary goal of scientific research and the linchpin of scientific methodology. Once an anomaly is discovered, he argues, a theory needs to be modified or replaced by a new one able to cope with the anomalous phenomenon in addition to all the phenomena explained by the old theory. This model of scientific development rests on the assumption that there are invariable ahistorical criteria of rationality which assure the orderly cumulative growth of scientific knowledge.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and Reference

  1. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962, 2nd ed., 1970)

    Google Scholar 

  2. T.S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (New York: Random House, 1957)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: NLB, 1975).

    Google Scholar 

  4. Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977), Ch. 1 and passim.

    Google Scholar 

  5. For example, Karl Popper, “Normal Science and Its Problems,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 51–58.

    Google Scholar 

  6. This belief originated with Karl Mannheim, who on this basis excluded all natural sciences from the sphere of competence of sociology of knowledge. For an opposite point of view see Robert K. Merton, “The Sociology of Knowledge” (1945), repr. in Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 513–14. More recently, the opposition to the sociology of scientific knowledge based on such a “rationality” argument has come from Larry Laudan (op. cit., ch. 7) and has been countered by the arguments of Barry Barnes and David Bloor (see Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn; Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Amsterdamska, O. (1987). Conclusions. In: Schools of Thought. Sociology of the Sciences Monographs, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3759-8_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3759-8_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8175-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3759-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics