Abstract
It is well-known that first-order languages can contain, in addition to monadic and polyadic predicates, n-place function symbols for any n. Still, many of the central concepts introduced in Chapter 2 (Q-predicates, constituents etc.) are primarily applicable to formal languages containing qualitative predicates. To be sure, Carnap’s notion of a monadic conceptual system leaves room for attribute spaces which are based upon some quantity (cf. Chapter 2.2). However, Carnap wished to avoid uncountable families of predicates, since that would lead to an uncountable number of Q-predicates as well. Therefore, he assumed that the value space of a real-valued quantity is partitioned into at most a denumerably infinite number of intervals. A more direct and more elegant way of treating quantitative concepts and laws — the so-called state space conception of theories — is given in this chapter. We shall see that the idea of a quantitative state space is in fact obtainable as a limiting case of Carnapian discrete conceptual systems.
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Notes
This is one of the questions discussed in Benacerraf and Putnam (1964).
See Duhem (1954).
I am not suggesting that a scientific realist should be a reductionist. Instead, I think that a reasonable ontology should accept emergent materialism with the Popperian Worlds 1, 2, and 3 (see Niiniluoto, 1984b, Ch. 9). However, the theory of truthlikeness in this book does not depend on these ontological issues.
See Scott and Suppes (1958), Krantz et al. (1971).
This argument from the Carnapian discrete space Q of Q-predicates to the quantitative state space was presented in 1983 in Niiniluoto (1986a).
See also Suppe (1974, 1976).
Our account here is simplified, since the distinction between T-theoretical and non-T-theoretical terms is not considered. Cf. Niiniluoto (1984b), Ch. 5.
The problem of idealization has been fruitfully discussed within Poznan school: see Nowak (1980), Krajewski (1977). See also Niiniluoto (1986a).
The propensity interpretation of probability was first developed by C. S. Peirce and Karl Popper as an alternative to the frequency interpretation (von Mises, Reichenbach). For the single-case interpretation, see Fetzer (1981) and Niiniluoto (1982d).
Cf. the discussion in Levi (1980a).
See also van Fraassen (1972). von Plato (1982) argues convincingly that one can in a sense associate objective physical probabilities also to deterministic systems (e.g., classical games of chance). However, single-case propensities (if they exist) are applicable only to genuinely indeterministic situations. Again, my strategy here is not to solve the problem of determinism and indeterminism, but to develop the theory of truthlikeness both for deterministic and probabilistic laws.
For the theory of stochastic processes, see Parzen (1962), Cramer and Leadbetter (1967).
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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Quantities, State Spaces, and Laws. In: Truthlikeness. Synthese Library, vol 185. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3739-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3739-0_3
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