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Naturalistic Epistemology pp 145–161Cite as

Wilfrid Sellars on the Nature of Thought

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 100))

Abstract

Wilfrid Seilars is, I believe, exceptional among contemporary philosophers for the seriousness of his concern to recognize both the power of the scientific enterprise and the centrality of our ordinary understanding of ourselves as persons. Sellars holds both that “science is the measure of what is and what is not” and that “if man had a radically different conception of himself he would be a radically different kind of man,” for “man is what he is because he thinks of himself in terms of this image [the manifest image, our ordinary way of understanding ourselves]” (Sellars, 1963a, pp. 6 and 15). Sellars’ goal is the formulation of a synoptic vision of human beings in the world, a scientific vision that does justice to our ordinary view of ourselves as sensory, conceptual and intentional agents.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lewis & Clark College, USA

    William A. Rottschaefer

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  1. William A. Rottschaefer
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Boston University, USA

    Abner Shimony

  2. University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

    Debra Nails

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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Rottschaefer, W.A. (1987). Wilfrid Sellars on the Nature of Thought. In: Shimony, A., Nails, D. (eds) Naturalistic Epistemology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 100. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3735-2_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3735-2_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8168-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3735-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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