Abstract
Sagal criticizes naturalistic epistemology genetically for falling short of the mission of justifying the sciences with “no circles and no gaps,” and he outlines a program, essentially along the lines of Paul Lorenzen’s constructive philosophy, which is intended to carry out that mission. I shall present some reasons for believing that the constructive program is unachievable. The answer which I shall then offer to Sagal’s criticisms of naturalistic epistemology is based in large part upon the inevitability of curtailing our philosophical ambitions.
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References
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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Shimony, A. (1987). Comment on Sagal. In: Shimony, A., Nails, D. (eds) Naturalistic Epistemology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 100. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3735-2_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3735-2_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8168-9
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