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Meinong’s Theory of Knowledge pp 27–49Cite as

Perception

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Part of the book series: Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ((MNPL,volume 28))

Abstract

The following thoughts were taken from Meinong’s literary remains:1 In the theory of knowledge, the degree of knowledge is the relationship between knowing and that which is known. In the beginning there is perception and its object.2 This relationship is a “basic fact,” and the theory of knowledge must state it as such. “It cannot be defined what the object of our knowledge of reality is, it can only be experienced.” That is the problem of transcendence.3 With the problem of transcendence, the theory of knowledge has, to its own disadvantage, “tied a knot, and by adding new loops has created for itself a never ending maze.” Alexander’s action should be imitated: It should simply be stated as a fundamental and characteristic property of existential knowledge that it is able to transcend.4

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Notes

  1. Kart. VII a, Erkenntnistheorie I, 1897–98.

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  2. Kart. VII, Leaf 3.

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  3. Ibid., Leaf 4.

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  4. Ibid, Leaf 5.

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  5. Ges.Ausg.Vol. V, “Erf.;” pp. 382ff.

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  6. R. Kindinger, “Das Problem der unvollkommenen Erkenntnisleistung in der Meinongischen Wahrnehmungslehre” in Meinonggedenkschrift; compare ibid.; also Weinhandl, “Das Aussenweltproblem bei A. Meinong: The causal relationship between external objects and perception is simply accepted by Meinong because it cannot be proven.

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  7. Ges. Ausg, Vol. I, “Üb. Begr. u. Eigensch. der Empfindung” p. 182: Sensation is a simple perceptual idea from peripheral stimulation, p. 183: The sensation of blue never occurs by itself. Any idea of the sensation of blue is abstract, the sensation of blue itself is not. p. 184: The contrast between concrete and abstract has no natural use in connection with the concept of sensation. Note [4]: Only in connection with complex ideas can we speak of concrete and perceptual.

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  8. In none of the works on Meinong which I read (except Findlay’s) were pseudo-objects discussed. Perhaps this can be explained with the general fear of Meinong’s alleged overpopulated universe and its consequences.

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  9. For example, Twardowski in Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen still speaks of ideas where Meinong speaks of perception. I agree with Weinhandrs interpretation in Meinong Gedenkschrift, p. 133: “In each perception the existence of the whole thing is given.” On page 134 he compares the object which is given in perception with Kant’s Ding-an-sich, with which I am not quite in agreement as will be seen in the following. Hugo Bergmann states in Untersuchungen zum Problem der inneren Wahrnehmung (p. 60) that perception is at first a pure judgment of existence. He who otherwise is very polemical toward Meinong concurs with him in these matters.

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  10. For the following, especially judgments of being and judgments of being thus-and-so, compare Em. Pres. Introduction with footnotes; Ges. Ausg. Vol. V. “Erf.” pp. 16–30, (371) – (481), (617) –(628).

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  11. Ges. Ausg. Vol. V. “Erf” compare the previous footnote. Ad objecta and complexes see Ges. Ausg. Vol. IV, Ann. II, chapter 8, and Kalsi, M. on O. of H. O., 12–19; ad objecta and analyzing judgments into ideas, Em. Pres. XXXII — LI; ad properties, Ges. Ausg. Vol. IV, Ann. II, 226, 235; and Vol. V. “Erf.” 28ff, (617); M. on O. of H. O., pp. 94ff.

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  12. Ges. Ausg. Vol V, “Erf.,” p. 29.

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  13. Compare Introductions to Em. Pres, and M. on O. of H. O.

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  14. Ges. Ausg. Vol. IV, Ann. II, p. 281: the example of the red cross.

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  15. Ges. Ausg., Vol. IV, Ann. II, pp. 25, 208, 226, 235, 237.

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  16. Karin Hermann, Dissertation, Einige Grundprobleme der Meinongischen Gegenstandstheorie, is important for Meinong’s ontology and theory of objects. Up to page 29, she discusses objectives, manners of being, objects of higher order, relati, relations, complexions, existence, and subsistence. Her discussion of relations (p. 94) seems problematical to me. Her interpretation follows Findlay’s interpretation too closely. On page 99 it contains a critique of real relati which uses Meinong’s unfortunate example of a real complex consisting of color and local determinations. (Our discussion will return to that.) Also page 107 relies too much on Findlay’s interpretation. However, the discussion of Russell’s argument against Meinong is excellent (p. 120). All in all, it seems to me that the author lacks the proper understanding of relate-complex/relation-complexion. Amazingly, pseudo-objects are completely ignored, only aussersein is mentioned.

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  17. M.on O.of H.O., pp.12ff.

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  18. Ibid., p. 13.

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  19. M. on O. of H. O., pp. 185–193; compare Karin Hermann: existing unfolding objects, pp. 48–51, especially on the timelessness of subsisting objects, a good and interesting chapter. Many references to Ernst Mally.

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  20. M.on O.of H.O.,p.17.

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  21. On the other hand, see Hermann, pp. 48, 51, 94, 99.

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  22. The following is based mainly on M. on O. of H. O., pp. 24ff.

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  23. Compare Hermann, p. 24, “Fremd- und Selbstpräsentation” The author gives an excellent and correct description of these modes of presentation.

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  24. Compare Em. Pres., Chapter I and p. XLVIII.

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  25. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “Üb. Gegst. Höh. Ord.” pp. 410f, Ges. Ausg., Vol. IV, Ann. II, pp. 138,264.

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  26. Compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. II “Gedächtnis” p. 192; “G.h.O.” pp. 412f; Vol. IV, Ann. II, p. 264 and Chapter I.

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  27. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, pp. 403f.

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  28. Compare M. on O. of H. O., pp. 36ff for further discussion of this subject matter.

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  29. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” pp. 382f, 403f.

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  30. Compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.;” pp. 406ff.

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  31. I refer again to Karin Hermann’s discussion of existence and subsistence, of the apriori and aposteriori, and the apprehension of subsisting objectives on the first pages of her dissertation. I do not accept unconditionally the beliefs of the author, but they deserve our attention.

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  32. Ges. Ausg.,Vol. IV, Ann. II, p.229.

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  33. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Analyse,” p. 313, in connection with psychic analysis (also translated in M. on O.of H.O.).

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  34. Compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” p. 435 (also in M. on O. of H. O.).

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  35. Compare discussion of aussersein in Em. Pres., p. XXXVIf.

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  36. Kaki, “On Meinong’s Pseudo-Objects”; Ges. Ausg.,t Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” pp. 403f, 415f (also in M.on O.of H.O.).

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  37. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” chapter 9 and pp. 414f; also M. on O. of H.O.

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  38. Ges. Ausg., Vol. V, “Erf.,” p. 56.

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  39. Concerning other-presentation, compare Em. Pres., Introduction.

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  40. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II; “G.h.O.; pp. 409–415; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  41. Ges. Ausg., Vol. V, “Erf.; pp. (425)ff, 433.

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  42. For further information concerning pseudo-objects, see Ges. Ausg., Vol. II “G.h.O.,” p. 440 to the end of the paper; M. on O. of H. O., p. 33; and Kalsi “On Mekong’s Pseudo-Objects.”

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  43. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II “G.h.O.,” pp. 415ff; also in M. on O. of H.O.

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  44. Compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” pp. 415ff; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  45. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” pp. 411f; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  46. Ibid., pp. 477, 59.

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  47. Compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. IV, Ann. II, chapter 8.

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  48. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” pp. 412f; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  49. Ad sphere of ideas: M on O. of H. O., pp. 33ff; Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.,” pp. 317f, 335ff, 388; ad sphere of judgments: M. on O. of H. O., pp. 33ff; Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, pp. 317f, 335ff, 342ff, 345, 353f, 356f, 361, 383, 392 and M. on O. of H. O.; Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” pp. 440, 479 and M. on O. of H. O.

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  50. Witasek would have called them “dispositions,” compare 276ff.

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  51. Em.Pres., p.XXXVII.

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  52. For the following, compare M. on O. of H. O., pp. 32ff with footnotes; Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.,” pp. 309–367 and also in M. on O. of H. O. In M. Gedenkschrifi, p. 138, Weinhandl demonstrates a very good understanding of Meinong’s theory of perception: The object of the perceptual idea is the concretum which is given in the judgment of existence. Objects of sensation as color, warmth, etc. are properties which are abstracted from the concretum.”

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  53. M.on O.of H.O., pp.32ff.

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  54. M. on O. of H. O., p. 32 and footnotes.

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  55. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.,” p. 333; and in M. on O. of H. O.

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  56. Ibid., p. 308.

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  57. Ibid., p. 409; and also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  58. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, pp. 333f, 360f; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  59. Ibid., “Psy. An.,” pp.344ff.

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  60. Compare “On Meinong’s Pseudo-Objects,” p. 116.

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  61. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.; pp. 338f; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  62. Ibid., pp. 314f, 317f.

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  63. Ibid., pp. 352f.

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  64. The reader is referred to M. on O. of H. O., p. 34.

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  65. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.,” pp. 347f, also in M. on O. of H. O.; but compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” chapter 19, also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  66. Compare example in Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.,” p. 347; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  67. M. on O. of H. O., p. 16 and footnotes; Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.” chapter 6; also in M. on O. of H. O. In her dissertation Karin Hermann discusses also Meinong’s theory of relations and real relates (p. 99). Unfortunately she criticizes only this unlucky example and does not pay any attention to the theory which the example is supposed to illustrate. Thus her interpretation, which follows Findlay closely, is full of misunderstandings. All in all, however, her book is important, but must be read with care.

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  68. M. on O. of H. O., pp. 32ff; Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.” chapters 1–4; also in M. on O.of H.O.

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  69. Ges. Ausg., Vol. V, pp. (394), (405)ff, 21.

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  70. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” third section; also in M. on O. of H. O.; see Hans Schermann, Meinong und Husserl Eine vergleichende Studie, pp. 263ff, concerning Meinong’s theory of the perception of temporally extended objects. My understanding of these matters differs considerably from Schermann. But his dissertation discusses mainly the thematic relationships between Husserl and Meinong.

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  71. For a detailed description of idea production, see M. on O. of H. O., pp. 30ff; Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Kompl. u. Rel.,” pp. 293ff; also in M. on O. of H. O.; Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” chapter 7, pp. (397)ff; also in M. on O. of H. O.; Vol. IV, Ann. II, pp. 279f.

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  72. Ad objects of higher order compare M. on O. of H. O., Introduction, Section III.

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  73. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.;” Chapter 7, pp. 397ff; also in M. on O. of H. O.; Ges. Ausg., Vol IV, Ann. II, p.279.

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  74. Compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. IV, Ann. IV, p. 279; Vol. II, p. 398; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  75. Weinhandl writes in Meinonggedenkschrifi, p. 139, that foundation accomplishes the same for objects of higher order as does perception for the ideas of real objects. The idea of the thing is not founded but is given in perception. P. 143: “After the causal connection the cognitive achievement follows.” — A very good understanding of Meinong’s perceptual theory.

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  76. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, p. 398; also in M. on O. of H. O.; Vol. IV, Ann. II, p. 279f.

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  77. Ibid.

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  78. M.on O.of H.O., pp.30f.

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  79. Ibid., pp 397ff.

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  80. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Kompl. und Rel.,” p. 293; also in M. on O. of H. O., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” p. 398; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  81. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” p. 399; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  82. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Kompl. und. Rel,” pp. 296f; also in M. on O. of H. O.; Vol. V, “Erf.;” pp. 25ff.

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  83. Ges. Ausg., Vol. V, “Erf.; pp. 19, 20, 22ff!!, 29, (406).

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  84. Ges. Ausg., Vol. H, “G.h.O.,” p. 445; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  85. M. on O. of H. O., paragraphs 19 and 21.

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  86. See M. on O. of H. O.: Complexions, Complexes; Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” p. 448, example on p. 461 of the train and the bird call; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  87. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, p. 460; Vol. I, pp. 443ff; both in M. on O. of H. O.

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  88. Ges. Ausg., Vol. V, “Erf.,” pp. 20ff, 29!, (478), 64,66; Vol. II, “Humest. II,” p. 128.

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  89. Husserl writes very critically about the example of the rolling ball, but he does not contribute to the understanding of Meinong’s example. In Husseriiana, Vol. X (p. 223), perception is taken as a continuous event. Husserl believes in “Kontinuierlich aufeinanderfolgende Jetztwahmehmungen” (p. 226). We cannot have ideas of distributed objects by means of indistributed contents. That is mathematical abstraction, he says (p. 227). In the perception of a melody, the perception of the last note is the perception of the melody. Husserl ignores idea production completely (p. 226). His remarks are critical and polemical.

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  90. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” (also in M. on O. of H. O.) pp. 443ff, 448f, 450, 455, 457f, 459, 461, 465; Vol. V, “Erf.,” p. 66; Vol. IV, Ann. II, p. 76f; Vol. I, p. 443ff; also in M. on O. of H.O.

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  91. Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” p. 461.

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  92. Ibid.

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  93. Compare Ges. Ausg., Vol. II, “G.h.O.,” p. 421; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  94. Ges. Ausg., Vol. I, “Psy. An.,” p. 354; also in M. on O. of H. O.

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  1. Southwest Texas State University, USA

    Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi

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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Kalsi, ML.S. (1987). Perception. In: Meinong’s Theory of Knowledge. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3641-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3641-6_2

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