Establishing the Correspondence Theory of Truth and Rendering It Coherent
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In his rewarding book, Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, Stephen Körner introduces the correspondence theory of truth as seemingly ‘the most natural analysis of truth’, explains what the theory tries to do, and what it does not attempt, defends the theory against some standard objections, and advances difficulties for rival theories of truth (see p.101ff.). What follows removes the limitations Körner claims to find on the correspondence theory; it also elaborates upon what Körner has explained, but at the same time makes one or two significant variations, as will appear.
KeywordsTrue Proposition Correspondence Theory Coherence Theory Material Implication Rival Theory
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