Abstract
Stephan Körner in an extensive essay, has convincingly shown the importance of what he calls “categorial frameworks” in our understanding of the world.1 The aim of the present essay is to contribute to a better understanding of the very idea of a categorial framework.
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Footnotes
Stephan Körner, Categorial Frameworks (Oxford, Blackwell, 1970).
Paul Weingertner, “Das Poblem des Gegenstandbereiches in der Metaphysik”, Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie XIX (1974), pp.35–70.
Roman Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt vol.1 Existentialontologie (Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1964). See pp.33 and 188.
Guido Küng, “The World As Noema and as Referent”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology Vol.3 (no.1, January 1972) pp.15–26. The paper brings very useful historical information and a thorough explanation of the notions mentioned in its title.
See G. Küng and J.T. Canty, “Substitutional Quantification and Leśniewskian Quantification”, Theoria 36 (1970) pp.165–182.
Already after submitting this paper to the Editor, I found a thorough examination of the same Körner ideas contained in the study “Logic and Ontology in the Study of Theory Change” by Stig Andur Pedersen (Copenhagen); the study appeared in Poźnan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities Vol.3 (nos.1–4 1977) (B.R. Grüner Co., Amsterdam). Pederson, basically agreeing with Körner’s approach, suggests a restatement of condition (i) — quoted above in footnote 2 -to transform it into the disjunction as suggested by me at the start of Section 2 in the present paper (see p.49 in the quoted issue of Poźnan Studies). For his claim Pederson offers a convincing argument, referring to the set-theoretical axiom of regularity; thus his argumentation is different from that presented in my paper. Pedersen discusses still other views of Körner’s on the role and structure of categorial frameworks, and hence his contribution can be recommended to all those who are seriously interested in the core of Körner’s ideas.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Marciszewski, W. (1987). The Modes of Philosophical Involvement with a Categorial Framework. In: Srzednicki, J.T.J. (eds) Stephan Körner — Philosophical Analysis and Reconstruction. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3639-3_7
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