Reply to Professor Chisholm

  • Stephan Körner
Part of the Nijhoff International Philosophy Series book series (NIPS, volume 28)


As often before in our conversations, discussions and cooperation (as coeditors of a volume of Brentano’s writings), Professor Chisholm has forced me to rethink and to clarify my position on an important philosophical issue. And as always, I am deeply grateful for his efforts. Chisholm finds an apparent inconsistency between on the one hand my rejection of Descarte’ method on the ground that it is intended to provide a criterion of “absolutely certain ‘truths of fact’” and on the other hand my “description of the general nature of psychological phenomena”. For, Chisholm argues, this description is not only, as we both agree, indebted to Brentano’s psychology but is — or could in the spirit of that psychology be — expressed by absolutely certain factual propositions.


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  1. 1.
    See e.g. Fundamental Questions of Philosophy Chapter 3 and Chapter 12.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Comments on Rule XII.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    See the writings mentioned by Chisholm.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    For details see e.g. Conceptual Thinking (Cambridge, 1955) pp.138ff. and Categorial Frameworks (Oxford, 1970) pp.51ff.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    See e.g. Alfred Kastil’s excellent introduction to Brentano’s philosophy Die Philosophie Franz Brentano’s (Bern 1951) p.22, p.29 et passim.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    See op.cit. p.22.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand from Brentano’s literary bequest (Bern, 1956).Google Scholar

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© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987

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  • Stephan Körner

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