Reply to Dr.Sylvan
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I found Dr.Routley-Sylvan’s discussion of my views on theories of truth very valuable and welcome the opportunity to clarify some points. The following remarks are based on emphasizing certain distinctions which, I think, are also of independent philosophical interest. They are (1) the distinction between general concepts of truth, which cannot serve as effective criteria of truth, and specific concepts of truth which can be used in this way; (2) the distinction between inferential relations which are either necessary or ampliative and inferential relations which are assumed to be both, necessary and ampliative; (3) the distinction between philosophical theses which as a matter of empirical fact have so far been generally accepted by philosophers and philosophical theses which are assumed to be “necessarily true” because they can be and have been, demonstrated by some specific and allegedly wholly reliable philosophical method.
KeywordsIntuitionist Logic Coherent System True Proposition Correspondence Theory True Sentence
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- 1.See Sect.I of the Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages which appeared in Polish in 1931. The English version constitutes Ch.VIII of Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Oxford, 1956).Google Scholar
- 2.See Metaphysics: Its Structure and Function (Cambridge University Press, 1984) Ch.10.Google Scholar
- 3.Compare Sect.I of my reply to Professor Chisholm.Google Scholar
- 4.See e.g. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B87.Google Scholar
- 5.E.g. in Chs.X & XV of Metaphysics: Its Structure and Function (Cambridge, 1984).Google Scholar
- 6.See op.cit. and Experience and Conduct (Cambridge, 1976).Google Scholar