Abstract
We demonstrate the existence of an electoral equilibrium when there are N voters, M candidates and K issues.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands
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Wittman, D. (1987). Elections with N Voters, M Candidates and K Issues. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8114-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3607-2
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