Abstract
Just as most continental European legislatures, the Norwegian parliament uses the successive voting procedure. This article discusses what kind of manipulatory strategies Norwegian legislators may use. By far the major part of Storting voting seems, however, to be sincere or non-strategic. The part of the voting process in which a manipulator is most likely to succeed occurs when the voting order is being determined. After the voting order is fixed, manipulatory manoeuvres are extremely unlikely.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands
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Rasch, B.E. (1987). Manipulation in a Multiparty Parliament: The Case of the Norwegian Storting. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_5
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