Abstract
The mapping of the distribution of voting weights into the indices of Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik, measuring a priori voting power, is not monotonic. Corresponding paradoxes imply a potential to increase an agent’s voting power by decreasing his voting weight. Paradox proofness of a voting body is achieved if the distribution of voting power is strictly proportional to the vote distribution. In this paper, a randomized decision rule is proposed to bring about paradox proofness.
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© 1987 Martus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Holler, M.J. (1987). Paradox Proof Decision Rules in Weighted Voting. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) The Logic of Multiparty Systems. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_25
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