Phenomenology and Relativism
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Husserl first made his name by denouncing psychologism in logic. In his influential Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900), the theories of Mill, Wundt, Sigwart and others are attacked as versions of ‘skeptical relativism’ which in various ways make truth dependent on the psychological make-up of human beings as a species (‘anthropologism’).1 Later, in ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’ (1910) the attack is extended to historical or cultural relativism (‘historicism’) as well, where his major target seems to be Dilthey.2 Husserl’s refutation seemed to clear the way for a philosophy which could rest assured of attaining objective, non-relative truths, and this assurance is evident not only in Husserl’s early work but also in that of this early followers (e.g., Geiger, Pfänder, Scheler).
KeywordsLogical Investigation Natural Attitude Perceptual Object Relativistic Interpretation Phenomenological Tradition
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- 24.See R.M. Chisholm, ‘Sentences Anout Believing’, and the discussion that has grown out of Chrisholm’s paper, in Intentionality, Mind and Language, ed. Ausonia Marras (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972); also the articles by myself (‘Intentionality’) and J.L. Mackie (‘Problems of Intentionality’) in Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding, ed. Edo Pivcevic ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 ).Google Scholar
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