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The Lifeworld Revisted: Husserl and Some Recent Interpreters

  • David Carr
Chapter
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 106)

Abstract

The concept of the lifeworld was of central importance to the revived interest in Husserl’s thought during th 1950’s and 1960’s. In Europe this revival was influenced jointly by the French existentialists and by the post-war publication of Husserl’s collected works. Maurice Merleau-Ponty had referred at several points in his 1945 Phenomenology of Perception to the unpublished portions of Husserl’s last work, The Crisis of European Sciences, in which the Lebenswelt figures prominentley, and those portions were then published in 1954 in vol. VI of Husserliana. As existential phenomenology attracted interest in North America in the 1960’s, Husserl’s late work was seen as part of a trend that included Merleau’s concept of the monde vécu and Heidegger’s emphasis in Being and Time on being-in-the-world.

Keywords

Scientific Theory Scientific Realism Linguistic Meaning Perceptual World Historical Sense 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr ( Evanston: Nortwestern University Press, 1970 ) p. 5.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Ibid. p. 17.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Milan Kundera, ‘The Novel and Europe’ New York Review of Books vol. 31 n° 12 (July 19, 1984) p. 15.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York: 1975) p. 39. Quoted by Richard Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979 ), p. 168.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    The Crisis, p. 106.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Ibid., p. 108.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Ibid., p. 11.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Ibid., p. 125.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Ibid., p. 127.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Ibid., p. 132.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Ibid., p. 134.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Ibid., p. 123.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Ibid., p. 142.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Ibid., p. 143.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
  16. 16.
    Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), Part two, Chapter one.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Ibid., p. 57.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    See my Phenomenology and the Problem of History (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974) Chapter 6.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Cartesian Meditations trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Mart Nijhoff, 1960), p. 61.Google Scholar
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    The Crisis, p. 121.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Ibid., p. 122.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
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  23. 23.
    Cartesian Meditations, p. 104.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Ibid., p. 93.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
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    The Crisis, p. 104.Google Scholar
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  28. 28.
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    See Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science ed. H. Dreyfus (Cambridge, Mass: the MIT Press, 1982) especially the reprinted articles by D. Follesdal; and Husserl and Intentionality by Ronald Mclntyre and David Woodruff Smith (Boston: Reidel, 1982).Google Scholar
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    A similar strategy is followed by John Searle in his Intentionality (Cambridge University Press, 1983), though no debt to Husserl is acknowledged.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Searle (op. cit. p. 5) explicitly follows such a model.Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    The propositional view is held by Searle (op. cit. pp. 40 ff). The ‘singular meaning’ view is advanced by I. Miller in his Husserl, Perception and Temporal Awareness (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1984 ) p. 55.Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Dreyfus (op. cit.) Introduction pp. 2 f.Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Husserl’s Identification of Meaning and Noema’in Dreyfus (op. cit.) p. 91.Google Scholar
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    The Crisis, p. 106.Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    E.g. Smith and McIntyre in Husserl and Intentionality (op. cit) p. XV.Google Scholar
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    The Crisis, p. 106.Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    Dreyfus (op. cit.) introduction, p. 23.Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    See Ideas I sections 30 and 31.Google Scholar
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    See Ernst Tugendhat Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (2nd.ed. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970) pp. 263 f.Google Scholar
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    Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenoly of Perception, trans. C. Smith ( New York: Humanities Press, 1962 ), p. X IV.Google Scholar
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    The Crisis, p. 51.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 113.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Carr
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of OttawaCanada

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