Analytic Philosophy, Phenomenology, and the Concept of Consciousness

Part of the American University Publications in Philosophy book series (MNPL, volume 29)


At long last there are hints that contemporary philosophy is beginning to transcend the sharp separation between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, which has so deeply divided twentieth-century Western thought for fifty years. The same conflict pervades psychological theory as well as philosophy, and will, apparently, be overcome only with great difficulty. The hints of emerging dialogue are no more than hints, but in any discussion of meeting points of psychoanalysis and philosophy — especially concerned with philosophy of mind — it seems appropriate to focus further inquiry upon a controversy that seriously divides both disciplines.


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  1. 1a.
    A volume of essays reflecting upon the relationship of these two movements is presented in H. A. Durfee, Analytic Philosophy And Phenomenology (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1976).Google Scholar
  2. 1b.
    In addition, the most useful evidence of attempts to transcend the division are K-O. Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language And The Geisteswissenschaften (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1967);Google Scholar
  3. 1c.
    S. A. Erickson, Language And Being: An Analytic Phenomenology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970);Google Scholar
  4. 1d.
    W. Mays and S. C. Brown, Linguistic Analysis And Phenomenology (London: Macmillan, 1972);Google Scholar
  5. 1e.
    A. Montefiore, Philosophy And Personal Relations (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1973);Google Scholar
  6. 1f.
    A. Montefiore, Philosophie et rapports interpresonnels (Montreal: Les Presses Universitaires, 1973);Google Scholar
  7. 1g.
    E. Pivcevic, Phenomenology And Philosophical Understanding (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975).Google Scholar
  8. 2.
    J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 130.Google Scholar
  9. 3a.
    M. Heidegger, An Introduction To Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) p. 114.Google Scholar
  10. 3b.
    See also M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible And The Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).Google Scholar
  11. 4.
    M. Dufrenne, Language And Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963) p. 16.Google Scholar
  12. 5.
    Ibid., p. 71.Google Scholar
  13. 6.
    Ibid., p. 96.Google Scholar
  14. 7.
    A-T. Tymieniecka, The Phenomenological Realism Of The Possible Worlds(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974) p. 327.Google Scholar
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    Dufrenne, Language And Philosophy, p. 96.Google Scholar
  16. 9.
    See R. C. Solomon, “Sense And Essence: Frege And Husserl,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 11 (1970) 378–401; also reprinted in Durfee, Analytic Philosophy And Phenomenology.Google Scholar
  17. 10a.
    See J. Compton, “Hare, Husserl, And Philosophic Discovery,” Dialogue 3 (1964) pp. 42–51;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 10b.
    R. Schmitt, “Phenomenology And Analysis,” Philosophy And Phenomenological Research, 23 (1962–63), pp. 101–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 10c.
    See also P. Ricoeur, “Husserl And Wittgenstein On Language,” in E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum, Phenomenology And Existentialism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), to which I am especially indebted in this section of the essay. The Compton and Ricoeur essays are both reprinted in Durfee, Analytic Philosophy And Phenomenology.Google Scholar
  20. 11.
    It is clear that some analytic philosophers do maintain major features of the doctrine of intentionality. See S. Hampshire, Thought And Action (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959).Google Scholar
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    G. Ryle, “Phenomenology,” in Phenomenology, Goodness And Beauty, Aristotelian Society Supplimentary Volume 11 (London: Harrison, 1932). Also reprinted in Durfee, Analytic Philosophy And Phenomenology.Google Scholar
  22. 13.
    It is especially strange that Mohanty does not deal directly with the controversy as posed and discussed by Ryle. See J. N. Mohanty, The Concept Of Intentionality (St. Louis: W. H. Green, 1972).Google Scholar
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    Ryle, “Phenomenology,” p. 79.Google Scholar
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    A. J. Ayer, “Phenomenology And Linguistic Analysis,” in Proceedings Of The Aristotelian Society, Supplimentary Volume 33 (London: Harrison, 1959) pp. 111–115. Also reprinted in Durfee, Analytic Philosophy And Phenomenology.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The American UniversityUSA

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