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The Market and The Metamarket

A Review of the Contributions of the Economic Theory of Property Rights

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Socialism: Institutional, Philosophical and Economic Issues

Part of the book series: International Studies in Economics and Econometrics ((ISEE,volume 14))

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Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to summarize contributions made by economists to the economic analysis of property rights. I believe that economists have made great strides recently toward the understanding of social institutions which for many years had been ignored and that the new hypotheses formulated by economists will be of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, and students of law. In addition, the reincorporation of the study of property rights into the field of economic theory has enabled economists to solve some problems which remained unsolved in the economic theory of the market, such as, for example, what conditions are necessary for the existence of workable competition, a more accurate definition of so-called “external effects,” remedies for “market failure,” the formulation of a theory of economic systems, and the answers to certain questions in the theory of the firm relating to ownership and control.1

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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Schwartz, P. (1987). The Market and The Metamarket. In: Pejovich, S. (eds) Socialism: Institutional, Philosophical and Economic Issues. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3571-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3571-6_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8097-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3571-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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