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The Pragmatic Paradox

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Self-Reference

Part of the book series: Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ((MNPL,volume 21))

Abstract

That these two positions each describe the same linguistic feature is further supported by the choice of examples which Rudolph Carnap chooses to illustrate those relations which he identifies as pragmatic. These examples are: “…they intend to assert…,” “When using this name…,” “… serves to express the assertion…,” “… is acknowledged…,” etc.3 It is well known of course that Carnap was skeptical about being able to develop a systematic pragmatics in the way that it is done for syntax and semantics. Morris, however, identifies a distinction which he attributes to C. S. Peirce which should have given pause to Carnap’s skepticism, namely Peirce’s distinction between “interpreter” and “interpretant.” Morris says,

The interpreter of a sign is an organism; the interpretant is the habit of the organism to respond, because of the sign vehicle, to absent objects which are relevant to a present problematic situation as if they were present.4

Some of the English verbs and verb phrases associated with illocutionary acts are: state, assert, describe, warn, remark, comment, approve, welcome, promise, express approval, and express regret.1

In terms … of the triadic relation of semiosis,… [o]ne may study the relations … of signs to interpreters. This relation will be called the pragmatical dimension of semiosis, symbolized by ‘D p ,’and the study of this dimension will be named pragmatics.2

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References

  1. John R. Searle, “What is a Speech Act?” The Philosophy of Language, ed. J. R. Searle Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 39.

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  2. Charles Morris, “Foundations of the Theory of Signs,” Foundations of the Unity of Science,eds., O. Neurath, R. L. Carnap, and C. Morris. Vol. 1, The University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. 84.

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  3. Rudolph Carnap, “Foundations of Logic and Mathematics,” Ibid.,pp. 147–148, italics mine

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  4. P. F. Stawson, “On Referring.” Mind (1950), reprinted in several places.

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  5. Alfred Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Reasearch, IV, 3 (1944) 345.

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  6. Robert L. Martin, “Toward a Solution To The Liar Paradox,” The Philosophical Review. LXXVI, 3 (July, 1967 ) 293.

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  7. Richard M. Martin, “The Pragmatics of Self-Reference,” Chapter 5 of Pragmatics, Truth, and Language.; Vol. 138 of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, p. 68.

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  8. Daniel Vanderveken, “Illocutionary Logic and Self-Defeating Speech Acts,” Speech, Act, theory, and Pragmatics, eds., John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980, pp. 247–272.

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  9. Myron Miller. The Logic of Self-Referring Knowledge Claims. Unpublished dissertation. New York University, 1977.

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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Miller, M. (1987). The Pragmatic Paradox. In: Bartlett, S.J., Suber, P. (eds) Self-Reference. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3551-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3551-8_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8088-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3551-8

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