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A Bibliography of Works on Reflexivity

  • Chapter
Self-Reference

Part of the book series: Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ((MNPL,volume 21))

Abstract

“Reflexivity” is the generic name for all kinds and species of circularity. It includes the self-reference of signs, the self-appplication of principles and predicates, the self-justification and self-refutation of propositions and inferences, the self-fulfillment and self-falsification of predictions, the self-creation and self-destruction of logical and legal entities, the self-augmentation and self-limitation of powers, circular reasoning, circular causation, cyclic and spiral recurrence, feedback systems, mutuality, reciprocity, and organic form. It includes the fallacious, the vicious, the trivial, and the question begging, but also the sound, the benign, the useful, and the inescapable. It ranges from the prosaic to the numinous, from the paradoxical to the self-evident, from science to religion. It is reality and appearance, native to the processes of the world and to our knowledge and discourse about them.

“I don’t have to quote anybody else to say what I could say for myself.”

--Anon

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Suber, P. (1987). A Bibliography of Works on Reflexivity. In: Bartlett, S.J., Suber, P. (eds) Self-Reference. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3551-8_15

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