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Causation and Self-Reference

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Self-Reference

Part of the book series: Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library ((MNPL,volume 21))

Abstract

Here, in broad strokes, is a complex of ideas: It seems patent that there is self-reference in natural languages like English: a sentence like, “This sentence contains five words,” seems undeniably true and, therefore, perfectly in order both syntactically and semantically. As is well known, causal conceptions of reference have recently been bruited about the literature. But if reference is causal, then it would seem to follow that self-reference must involve self-causation. On the other hand, even if it is not exactly clear why, it does seem that the causal relation cannot be reflexive. It seems to me premature to conclude forthwith that these ideas are a reductio ad absurdum of causal conceptions of reference: consequently, I should like to explore them here.

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Notes

  1. Saul Kripke, “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” The Journal of Philosophy,LXII (6 November 1975), 691–692.

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  2. Cf. my “On Self-Reference,” The Philosophical Review,LXXIX (October 1970), 523–538.

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  3. David Kaplan, “Quantifying In,” reprinted in Reference and Modality, Leonard Linsky, ed., OUP, 1971, p. 132.

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  4. David Kaplan, “What is Russell’s Theory of Descriptions?” in Betrand Russell, D.F. Pears, ed., Anchor, 1972, p. 236.

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  5. Cf. Saul Kripke, “Is Theory a Problem About Substitutional Quantification?” in Truth and Meaning,Gareth Evans and John McDowell, eds., Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 325–419; section 1 is especially good on such matters.

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  6. W.V. Quine, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, 1973, p. 5.

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  7. Cf. Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time and Spacetime,University of California Press, 1977, pg. 311 for a discussion of causal loops.

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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Hart, W.D. (1987). Causation and Self-Reference. In: Bartlett, S.J., Suber, P. (eds) Self-Reference. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3551-8_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3551-8_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8088-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3551-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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