Abstract
When is what one person thinks the same as what another person thinks, or the same as what he thinks on another occasion? That is the question that I want to discuss: the question of the identity of what is thought, and in particular the identity of what is thought in the case of thoughts that are expressed indexically. I use the expression “thinking” in such a way that it applies both to acts of judgement and to beliefs — the states activated or instigated by such acts.
Reporter: How do you see the chances for a suspension of hostilities?
Kissinger: I’m fairly optimistic. For example, we share the conviction that it would be a good idea for the other side to retreat.
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References
D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, unpublished manuscript, 1977, p. 60; cf. S. Stich, “Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis”, Monist, 61, 1978, 578 (but see the appendix 586 f.).
T. McKay, “On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions”, Philosophical Studies, 39, 1981, 289
cf. C. McGinn, “Charity, Interpretation and Belief”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXXIV, 1977, 527–533.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, Ch. 29, Loeb Classical Library, 287.
Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 12.
E. Husserl, Logical Investigations trans, by J.N. Findlay, London: Routiedge, 1970, Vol. II, esp. first Investigation §12; fifth Investigation § § 17ff
A. Reinach “On the Theory of the Negative Judgement” in B. Smith ed., Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia, 1982, 334 ff. (GS 77 ff.)
Cf. for example B. Russell “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, in Mysticism and Logic, London: Allen and Unwin, 1974, 162.
Cf. for example, A.N. Whitehead The Concept of Nature, Cambridge: University Press, 1964, Ch. 1; Process and Reality, Cambridge: University Press, 1929, Part II, § 1.
K. Donnellan, “Speaking of Nothing”, Philosophical Review, 83, 1974, 11f.
J. Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical” Nous, 13, 1979.11
D. Kaplan, “How to Russell a Frege-Church”, Journal of Philosophy, 72, 1975; “Dthat”, in French et al. eds. Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis, 1979.
L. Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, Oxford: Blackwell, 1961, 96 f.; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5422.
I disagree, therefore, with, for example, S. Schiffer, “The Basis of Reference”, Erkenntnis, 13, 1978, 171.
In this respect singular propositions differ fundamentally from Fregean Gedanken. In “Indexikalität, Sinn und propositionaler Gehalt”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 18, 1982, I have tried to set out Frege’s theory of indcxicality.
Findlay’s translation of Husserl’s (and Frege’s) term “kundgeben”, cf. Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Vol. II, I, § 7.
Compare Donnellan and Kripke on sentences containing empty proper names: “If a child says, ‘Santa Claus will come tonight’, he has not expressed a proposition” (K. Donnellan, 1974, 20 f.). “A sentence containing a proper name expresses a proposition if and only if the name has reference. . Take some sentence about Moses; if Moses doesn’t exist people can’t use that sentence to express a proposition” (S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, XX-XX).
Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, in Logic and Knowledge, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956, 242.
The lexico-grammatical sense of a declarative sentence is, too, to be distinguished from the Fregean ‘thought’ or ‘sense’ it expresses. According to Frege, the sentence “Today is Monday” can be used on successive days to express different ‘thoughts’; but the sentence does not change its lexico-grammatical sense every twenty-four hours at midnight (see note 14 above). Applied to Frege’s theory, the moral of the present paper is: our answers to the question what someone judges or believes can be guided by two different sets of considerations; Frege’s notion of a ‘thought’ does not do justice to either. It ought therefore to be replaced by two successor notions. See also Husserl’s fifth Investigation. § 21.
Aquinas, De Veritate, q. I, a. 5.
Cf. H.-N. Castaneda, “Reference, Reality and Perceptual Fields”, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 53, 1980, and the earlier papers on index-icality by Castaneda mentioned there.
Cf. A Woodfield, “On Specifying the Contents of Thought”, in Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object, Oxford: 1982, 286. The discussion of (S7) shows that Kaplan’s distinction between “content” and “character” is inadequate.
Aristotle, De Anima, III, 3.
Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 5 and 6.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, II, xi, 217.
Cf. D.C. Dennett, “Beyond Belief, in Woodfield” (1982), 80.
Plato, “Theaetetus”, 155b-c, in ed. F.M. Cornford Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, 42; Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIV, 1. Cf. W. Künne Abstrakte Gegenstände, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, ch. 2, § 1.
E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, (LI), V, § 13.
A. Reinach “On the Theory of the Negative Judgement” (TNJ) in ed. B. Smith, Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia, 1982, 320, GS 62. Cf. F. Bassenge’s reference to Aristotle in “Hexis und Akt”, Philosophischer Anzeiger, 4, 1930, 163–168.
LI, V, §§ 37–43.
LI, V, § 17.
LI, V, § 20.
E. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytic Philosophy. Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, 1982, 157 ff. This misinterpretation is already apparent in Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967, pp. 35–38; it is developed in the article “Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse” in eds. R. Bubner et al Hermeneutik und Dialektik Bd. II, Tubingen, 1970,I, 3 and is repeated in the “Lectures” 157. Cf. also K. Mulligan and B. Smith “Traditional vs. Analytic Philosophy” — a discussion of Tugendhat’s “Lectures” in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 21, 1984, 193–202, 196.
Cf. LI,V, § 20; and Reinach’s criticisms: TNJ 374, note 21, GS 85, note 1.
Quoted in B. Smith’s informative introduction to his translation TNJ, in ed. B. Smith (1982) 310, note 16; and see p. 24 this volume.
TNJ 374, note 21, GS 85; cf. TNJ 374, note 16, GS 81 f., Anm. 1.
TNJ 316 and passim, GS 58 and passim.
LI, V, § 33.
TNJ 343, GS 88; TNJ 346, GS 92; TNJ 355 f., GS 98; TNJ 366 f., GS 110 f. Reinach’s position on this point is close to that of Russell. This is not clear in B. Smith’s Introduction, 294.
On these terms see TNJ 335, GS 78; and W. Künne, Abstrakte Gegenstände. Semantik und Ontologie, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983, ch. 2.
TNJ 367, GS 111.
TNJ 339, GS 83 f; cf TNJ 375, note 37, GS 108, Anm. 1.
R. Barcan Marcus, “Rationality and Believing the Impossible”, Journal of Philosophy, 80, 1983.
S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.
If someone points to a map and at the same time utters (S10), then he can of course make a false assertion.
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Künne, W. (1987). The Intentionality of Thinking: The Difference Between State of Affairs and Propositional Matter. In: Mulligan, K. (eds) Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Primary Sources in Phenomenology, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3521-1_8
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