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Demystifying Reinach’s Legal Theory

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Speech Act and Sachverhalt

Part of the book series: Primary Sources in Phenomenology ((PSIP,volume 1))

Abstract

Adolf Reinach has not fared well at the hands of writers and commentators in jurisprudence and legal theory,1 critics whose mystification of Reinach’s view often has been disguised in claims to the effect that Reinach is the one doing the mystifying. One major writer sees a connection between Reinach’s theory and nineteenth-century Begriffsjurisprudenz or legal conceptualism.2 Another writer, a legal philosopher, points to Reinach as offering a theory ofthe Natur der Sache, from which, as it happened, other developed a species of natural law theory.3 A leading historian of legal theory, drawing on Reinach’s talk of “a priori essences”, relegates him to a never-never land:

Having thus established to their own satisfaction that it is a vain delusion to look for a purely empirical solution of the problem of the nature of law, the metaphysicians begin the search for some a priori concept existing independently of all possible experience . . . Perhaps no one has cut himself off from the facts of experience so sharply as Reinach, for whom the foundations of positive law belong to a realm which is not only distinct from the world of Nature but also independent of human understanding, of human organizations, and of all the actual course of human or material occurrences.4

My special thanks to Bonnie Paulson, Barry Smith, Herbert Spiegelberg, Carl Wellman, Kenneth I. Winston, and Daniel E. Wueste.

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References

  1. Without restricting himself to legal theory, Herbert Spiegelberg made essentially the same observation fifty years ago; up until very recently, little had changed. See Herbert Spiegelberg, Gesetz und Sittengesetz, Zürich: Max Niehans Verlag (1935), 24, 38.

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  3. Gustav Radbruch, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle & Meyer (1914), 35n. Writing only a year after the appearance of Reinach’s “The a priori Foundations of the Civil Law” (cited at note 9), Radbruch asserts that Reinach’s “a priori foundations” are “nothing other than the ‘Natur der Sache’” (or “nature of the thing”, whose proponents argue that certain values are inherent in the thing itself and that norms reflecting these values are thus derivable from the thing). Others, much later, have traced the development in Germany of one species of natural law theory from the concept of the Natur der Sache, and they address the question of Reinach’s influence on that development. See the helpful statements in Part One of Die ontologische Begründung des Rechts, Arthur Kaufmann, ed., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (1965), in particular, Alessandro Baratta’s paper, “Natur der Sache und Naturrecht”, at 104 – 163.

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  11. As a rendering of “Bestimmung” in legal contexts, “legally issued norm” is, to be sure, less than ideal. Still, the expression does avoid some of the problems created by more obvious candidates, e.g., “enactment” and “rule”. “Enactment”, useful though it may be, is tied to the legislative context and will not do when Reinach speaks, inter alia, of arbitrators’ Bestimmungen. (See J 804–805; GS 301–302; PdR 170; trans. 105.) And “rule” will not do either. Rules are by definition general, but the Bestimmungen of arbitrators, judges, and other officials are rulings, confined, strictly speaking, to the particular case giving rise to the decision. Ideally, the English-language expression would be systematically ambiguous in all the ways “Bestimmung” is; given this standard, “legally issued norm” or, where appropriate, simply “issued norm” (see §6 at subsection iii, below) is a more apt choice than other candidates.

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  17. See, however, Larenz, Methodenlehre, op. cit. (note 8), pp. 108–111; Karl Larenz, “Originäre Rechtssachverhalte”, in: Phänomenologie, Rechtsphilosophie, Jurisprudenz. Festschrift für Gerhart Husserl zum 75. Geburtstag, Thomas Würtenberger, ed., Frankfurt am Main: Vit-torio Klostermann (1969), 132–151, at 136–146. Here Larenz’s reading of Reinach is unprob-lematic. The difficulties arise, as I argue in the second and third sections of the paper, when he tries to spell out a normative reduction in terms of what he takes Reinach to be doing in the name of Bestimmungen or legally issued norms.

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  18. See the papers by Mulligan, Pollok, Gardies, and Brown in this volume. See also John F. Crosby, “Reinach’s Discovery of the Social Acts”, Aletheia, vol. 3 (1983), 143–194

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  23. For an American representative, see, e.g., Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, New York: Tudor Publishing Company (1930); and for a Scandinavian representative, e.g.,

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  28. Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1963),35–37,70–74.

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  29. See text quoted at note 9. Although not expressly cited by Reinach — indeed, “The a priori Foundations” contains only a handful of references to source material in legal theory — Thon’s treatise, like Binding’s (cited at note 12), was a standard nineteenth-century source on the imperative theory, and the treatise was widely discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [1911], 299–308, 586–591). 22 Op.cit. (note 12).

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  31. Ibid.

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  32. Ibid. (emphasis omitted).

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  33. Op. cit. (note 12). For the view that imperatives in the criminal law are addressed only to officials, see Thomas Hobbes,in The Elements of Law, Ferdinand Tönnies, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1889), 187: “Now in those laws, which are simply laws, the commandment is addressed to every man; but in penal laws the commandment is addressed to the magistrate, who is only guilty of the breach of it, when the penalties ordained are not inflicted; to the rest appertained nothing, but to take notice of their danger.” Compare Hobbes, De Cive, ch. xiv, §23, to which Binding, loc. cit., vol. 1 at 39n, refers.

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  34. Thon, Rechtsnorm und subjektives Recht, 59, 132, 181, 211, et passim.

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  35. Ibid., 291–292.

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  36. Ibid., 228–235.

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  37. Ibid., 13, 121, et passim.

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  38. Ibid., 28.

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  39. Ibid., 291–292.

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  40. Ibid., 292.

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  41. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (2nd ed. 1960), op. cit. (note 6), § §28(a)-30(b).

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  42. Kelsen, op. cit. (note 6). See, on the reading, Stanley L. Paulson, “Stellt die ‘Allgemeine Theorie der Normen’ einen Bruch in Kelsens Lehre dar?” in: Die Reine Rechtslehre in wissenschaftlicher Diskussion (“Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen-Instituts”, vol. 7), Vienna: Manz (1982), 122–141, at 129–130.

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  43. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1961).

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  44. See, e.g., Karl Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken, Stuttgart, Berlin, Cologne, Mainz: Kohlhammer (7th ed. 1977)

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  45. Ota Weinberger, “Die normenlogische Basis der Rechtsdynamik”, in: Gesetzgebungstheorie, Juristische Logik, Zivil- und Prozeßrecht. Gedächtnisschrift fir Jürgen Rödig, Ulrich Klug, et al., eds., Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag (1978), 173–190, at 182–183

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  46. Ota Weinberger, Normentheorie als Grundlage der Jurisprudenz und Ethik, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (1981), 60–62, et passim.

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  47. See generally Eugenio Bulygin, “Norms, normative propositions, and legal Statements”, in: Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey, Guttorm Fløistad, ed., vol. 3, The Hague, Boston, London: Nijhoff (1982), 127–152. Credit for the distinction between norms and normative propositions (or statements) is often given to Georg Henrik von Wright and in legal theory to Hans Kelsen, with reference to his more recent writings. It is, then, of some interest to note that Reinach, much earlier, states the distinction clearly and uses it to good advantage; see J 802–804, 817–818; GS 299–300, 316–317; PdR 167–168, 187; trans. 103–104, 116. It is sometimes assumed that the distinction tracks on the German-language expressions “Rechtsnorm” and “Rechtssatz”, and Kelsen in his later writings introduces it in exactly this way; however, many writers (Reinach among them) use “Rechtssatz” for, inter alia, a statutory formulation of a norm, but a norm nonetheless. In short, Reinach draws the modern distinction but not in the terms familiar from those who are said to have discovered it.

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  48. Kelsen, for one, sometimes talks as though he had a translation thesis in mind: “I ought not, or I am obligated not to steal, or: I ought to, or I am obligated to repay such a loan, means in the positive law nothing other than [bedeutet positiv rechtlich nichts anderes als] : If I steal, I ought to be punished, if I fail to pay back a loan, a lien ought to be taken on my property.” Hans Kelsen, “Die Idee des Naturrechtes”, Zeitschrift fir öffentliches Recht, vol. 7 (1928), 221–250, at 226 (my emphasis), reprinted in Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule, Hans Klecatsky, René Marcic, and Herbert Schambeck, eds., vol. 1, Vienna: Europa Verlag (1968), 245–280, at 251.

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  49. See Larenz, “Bestimmungssatz”, op. cit. (note 8); Larenz, Methodenlehre, op. cit. (note 8). Larenz’s statement in the article is slightly more detailed than in his Methodenlehre, and I have therefore relied primarily on it, with cross references to the statement in the treatise.

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  50. Cited at note 37.

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  51. Larenz, “Bestimmungssatz”, 151–153; Larenz, Methodenlehre, 243–245.

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  52. Larenz, “Bestimmungssatz”, 152–153.

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  53. 52 U.S. Stat. 809 (June 21, 1938).

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  54. Larenz, “Bestimmungssatz”, 153; Larenz, Methodenlehre, 245.

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  55. Larenz, “Bestimmungssatz”, 154, 157–160; Larenz, Methodenlehre, 245–246.

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  56. Larenz, “Bestimmungssatz”, 154.

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  57. Ibid.

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  58. J 803; GS 299; PdR 167; trans. 103–104.

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  59. Stating the position of, inter alia, Ernst Zitelmann, Irrtum und Rechtsgeschäft, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot (1879), Reinach writes: “If we consider specifically legal concepts, property, claim, obligation, agency [Vertretung], and the like, the law has not found these and taken them over, but has itself created them, produced them.” J 686–687; GS 168; PdR 12; trans. 3.

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  60. See note 15.

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  61. J 687; GS 168; PdR 12–13; trans. 3.

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  62. On Reinach’s concept of the a priori, see, in particular, Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen III, in: ibid., Bd. 2, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag (6th printing, 1980), 225–293. English translation by J.N. Findlay, Logical Investigations, vol. 2, London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul (1970), 436–489. See also Barry Smith, “On the Theory of the Negative Judgement”, op. cit. (note 14); Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, op. cit. (note 14), 194–196, 198–200.

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  63. Barry Smith, “On the Theory of the Negative Judgement”, op. cit. (note 14), 297.

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  64. The qualification (“to the extent. . . ”) invites attention to deviations (Abweichungen) in the positive law — deviations, that is to say, from the pattern of essential legal relations. See J 804; GS 301; PdR 169; trans. 104.

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  65. J 698; GS 180; PdR 27–28; trans. 12.

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  66. Positions stemming from the correlativity thesis have not, however, gone unchallenged; see, e.g., Neil MacCormick, “Rights and Legislation”, in: Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart, P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press (1977), 189–209.

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  67. J 691; GS 173; PdR 18; trans. 6.

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  68. J 690–691; GS 172–173; PdR 17–18; trans. 5–6. See also Herbert Spiegelberg. ThePhenomenological Movement, op. cit. (note 14), 198–200.

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  69. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1968); John Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1969). For comparisons of Reinach with Austin and Searle, see John F. Crosby, “Reinach’s Discovery of the Social Acts”, op cit. (note 14); Barry Smith, “Materials Toward a History of Speech Act Theory”, op. cit. (note 14). See also Barry Smith, “Phänomenologie und angelsächsische Philosophie”, Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, vol 37 (1984), 387–405.

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  70. On the individual norm qua law contained, say, in a contract (rather than the application of a norm about contracts), see Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order, Kenneth I. Winston, ed., Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press (1981), 174–175, 176.

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  71. J705;GS189;PdR 37–38; trans. 18.

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  72. J705;GS 189;PdR 38; trans. 18.

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  73. J706; GS 189; PdR 38; trans. 18.

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  74. J 706, 805; GS 190, 302; PdR 38–39, 170; trans. 18–19, 106.

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  75. J 707; GS 190; PdR 39; trans. 19.

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  79. J 707;GS 191;PdR39;trans. 19.

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  80. J 709; GS 193–194; PdR 42–43; trans. 21.

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  81. Indeed, the strength of the requirement that distinguishes the social act, viz., that the act be communicated and understood (vernehmungsbedürftig), is determined by whether or not the act involves a second subject, related to it in a particular way. If it does, then, as Reinach points out for the case of the command (see text at note 70), the second subject must be in a position to learn of the act. If, on the other hand, the act does not involve a second subject, a personal element, as — here — in the case of the legally issued norm or Bestimmung, then general publicity is all that can be asked for. Promulgation of the legislative enactment is the paradigm.

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  82. I follow — indeed, make the most of — Reinach’s sharp distinction between personal commands and general legislative provisions. See subsection iii, below, for details.

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  83. J805;GS302;PdR 170; trans. 105.

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  84. J 805; GS 302–303;PdR 171; trans. 106.

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  85. J 805 ; GS 302 ;PdR 171; trans. 106.

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  87. J 817;GS316;PdR 186–187; trans. 115–116.

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  89. Though the rubric “general commands” is familiar enough from the traditional literature, the task of deciding what criteria are appropriate for identifying general commands has proved to be a stumbling block. One recalls, for example, John Austin’s quarrel with Blackstone in the first of the Lectures on Jurispridence, op. cit. (note 11). Austin insists on generality with respect to the acts governed by the norm, Blackstone, on generality with respect to persons subject to the norm. For the nineteenth-century Continental position, see Karl Binding, Die Normen und ihre Übertretung, op. cit. (note 12), vol. 1, at 126–127. Alongside views such as these, Reinach’s conception of the distinction between personal commands and general legislative provisions is truly revolutionary.

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  90. J 805–806; GS 303; PdR 171 ; trans. 106.

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  91. Text quoted at note 9.

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  92. See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen III, op. cit. (note 53); see also Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan, “Pieces of a Theory”, in: Parts and Moments, op. cit. (note 14), 15–109, at 35–45.

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  93. See Edmund Husserl, “Adolf Reinach” (obituary notice), Kant-Studien, vol. 13 (1919), 147–149, and compare Husserl’s shorter obituary notice, “Adolf Reinach”, Frankfurter Zeitung, 6 December 1917, p. 1. See also Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, op. cit. (note 14), 166–170, 193, et passim; Barry Smith, “On the Theory of the Negative Judgement”, op. cit. (note 14), 289, 297, 298, et passim; Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, “Einleitung”, in: Die Nachlässe der Müchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staats-bibliothek, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz (1975), vii-xvii; Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, “Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography”, in this volume, 3–27.

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  94. J 696; GS 179; PdR 26; trans. 11.

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  95. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, op. cit. (note 14), 198.

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  96. Adolf Reinach, “Was ist Phänomenologie?” (1914 Marburg lecture), in: GS 379–405, at 405 (and see 381, 384–385, 389, 392, 394); reprinted with a foreword by Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Munich: Kösel-Verlag (1953), 71 (and see 24–25, 32, 40, 46, 50); and translated by Dallas Willard under the title “Concerning Phenomenology”, in The Personalist, vol. 50 (1969), 194–221, at 220 (and see 196, 200, 204, 207, 210). See also Reinach, “Die apriorischen Grundlagen”, J 690, 805; GS 171, 301–302; PdR 16, 170; trans. 105. On the slogan “zu den Sachen”, see generally Herbert Spiegelberg, Doing Phenomenology, The Hague: Nijhoff (1975), 14–15.

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  97. Lon L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 92 (1978), 353–409, at 364, reprinted (with omissions) in Fuller, Principles of Social Order, op. cit. (note 61), 86–124, at 92.

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  98. See Lon L. Fuller, “Forms and Limits”, op. cit. (note 88), at 363–372, et passim, reprinted in Fuller, Principles of Social Order, op. cit. (note 61), at 90–98, er passim.

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  99. See, e.g., Philip Selznick’s case for legality as the peculiarly legal value in “Sociology and Natural Law”, Natural Law Forum, vol. 6 (1961), 84–108, reprinted (with minor revisions) in: The Social Organization of Law, D. Black and M. Mileski, eds., New York: Seminar Press (1973), 16–40. Compare Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue”, Law Quarterly Review, vol. 93 (1977), 195–211, reprinted (with revisions) in: Raz, The Authority of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1979), at 210–229. Another suggestive statement, reflecting a broad perspective, is Timothy O’Hagan’s The End of Law?, Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1984): see Chapter Six, “Towards a Rechtsstaat”, 116–169.

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Paulson, S.L. (1987). Demystifying Reinach’s Legal Theory. In: Mulligan, K. (eds) Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Primary Sources in Phenomenology, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3521-1_6

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