Abstract
Both ultimate hopes and fundamental hope have certain implications. The implications of ultimate hope are cognitional, conative, and affective: they include beliefs, kinds of readiness or dispositions, and trust. The implications of fundamental hope also have to do with trust.
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References
For this notion of “background beliefs” I am indebted to James Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope, p. 47.
I and Thou, pp. 153–55.
In chapter 7, pp. 40–42, 44.
Whereas I distinguish between fundamental hope and trust, James Muyskens, exploring William James’s understanding of religion, finds that James’s understanding of trust is close to Muyskens’ own understanding of hope (The Sufficiency of Hope, p. 102). But this notion of hope is aimed hope, not my fundamental hope. There are some similarities between my understandings of trust and Muyskens’ analyses of believing-in (Sufficiency, p. 42, 122).
See analysis of such separability on pp. 160–61.
Coming to know trust in these ways is diverse. The psychological sciences and the sociological can get at trust only insofar as it can be recognized as an attitude, as a characteristic of a subject or group, and they can get at its causes only insofar as these are subject to third-person analysis. Third-person anlysis is truncated, first-person is opaque (the input of freedom), and second-person is elusive, accessible perhaps via Gabriel Marcel’s secondary reflection. Among significant and sophisticated studies of trust are those of psychologist, professor and counselor Carolyn Gratton, Trusting: Theory and Practice (New York: Crossroad, 1982) and of philosopher Donald Evans, Struggle and Fulfillment: The Inner Dynamics of Religion and Morality (Cleveland and New York: Collins, 1979) and Faith, Authenticity and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).
Also helpful is philosopher and Buber scholar Maurice Friedman, Touchstones of Reality: Existential Trust and the Community of Peace (New York: Dutton, 1972) and the works of philosopher and educational theorist Otto Friedrich Bollnow.
“Necessarily” here has the sense of what is sometimes termed, in contrast with logical necessity, “physical” or “factual” necessity.
“Implies” here signifies what Donald D. Evans identifies as speaker-independent prima facie implication. The Logic of Self-Involvement: A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special Reference to the Christian use of Language about God as Creator (London: SCM Press, 1963, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), pp. 46–50.
These points about intersubjective trust and what it implies are similar to the relationships between hoping and its precipitated or derivative assertions as these are found in Marcel’s definitions of hope, chapter 12, pp. 125–27.
Sam Keen, Apology for Wonder (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 204.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Godfrey, J.J. (1987). Implications of Hope. In: Godfrey, J.J. (eds) A Philosophy of Human Hope. Studies in Philosophy and Religion, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3499-3_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3499-3_16
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