Abstract
In recent years, a new mathematical problem has been proposed in the engineering literature. The main features of this problem, called closed-loop Stackelberg (CLS) problem, can be described in the following way.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Carraro, C. (1987). Hierarchical Games for Macroeconomic Policy Analysis. In: Carraro, C., Sartore, D. (eds) Developments of Control Theory for Economic Analysis. Advanced Studies in Theoretical and Applied Econometrics, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3495-5_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3495-5_13
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