Sociology, ontology and totality in Georg Lukacs

Abstract

Let me first restate the choice we face before considering Georg Lukacs. The choice we have offered the reader from the beginning pages of this volume is real. The choice is between the finite search for wholeness and the quest for totalities beyond finite limitations. What makes the choice real is that now we can draw the line between positive and negative transcendence by refusing to play the game of totalisms. The choice enables us to say ‘no’ to any totality that is external to man’s finite search. We can choose between Self-1 and Self-2. We can say ‘no’ to Self-2 with its grandiose plans of self-deification or its flirtations with external totalities. As a free and separate awareness Self-2 does surpass the controlled directional awareness of Self-1 but it lacks directional awareness. This does not mean, as in Sartre, that this lack of directional awareness in Self-2 makes the quest for totalities inevitable. Totality is one possibility among other possible modes of directionality that Self-2 may apprehend. Sartre’s statement that ‘human reality is its own surpassing toward what it lacks’ is a way of saying that man is transcendence, as in Heidegger’s ontology. From my perspective transcendence is just a capacity of the self. There is no a priori ontological connection between the lack and its fulfillment. Self-2 may choose to go along with Self-1 on its finite search for wholeness; or, it may choose otherwise. Both parts of the self have free choices. But the distinction between Self-1 and Self-2 enables us to draw the line between positive and negative transcendence and say ‘no’ to the quest for totalities.