Abstract
Classical Rationalists wanted rational inquiry to be an objective and conclusive decision method. This led them to adopt the impossibly high requirement of certainty, and to introduce conflicts within the theory of rationality by claiming ‘Reason’ as a source of certainty. The traditional modifications of Classical Rationalism, namely Mitigated Skepticism and Mitigated Dogmatism, retained the ideal of rational inquiry as a decision procedure. However, they abandoned the requirement of objectivity for the decision method. The basis of the decision method would be non-rational commitments, commitments which are neither open to rational assessment nor claimed as rationally certain. Similarly, the modified versions of rationalism only expect agreement among those who accept the same set of non-rational commitments as a basis of their inquiries; agreement is not expected among all rational people. These modifications, however, crippled the ability of rational inquiry to aid the pursuit of traditional goals, such as the goal of finding the truth.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Berkson, W. (1987). Skeptical Rationalism. In: Agassi, J., Jarvie, I.C. (eds) Rationality: The Critical View. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3491-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3491-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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