Abstract
This paper is an attack on the widely held view that judgments on works of art are irremediably subjective. Subjectivism, as it will be called, has its attractive and its less attractive sides. It is simple; it plausibly explains why there is so much disagreement in criticism of the arts; and, while arguments for and against it can be deployed, none of the arguments against is conclusive. This latter quality may be thought by some to be unattractive, and even a reason for rejecting subjectivism. Another unattractive feature of the subjective view is that it entails relativism, since from
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All judgments are subjective together with (presumably), the trivial minor premiss
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All subjectivities are equal it follows that
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All judgments are equal.
Thus, according to subjectivism, any judgment made by any person at any stage of his life is equal to any other judgment. Naive overestimations of current fads, the untrained comments of children, the considered views of experts, all are equal. There can be no such thing as progress in our ability to make better judgments as we grow older and learn more, or as works and periods come into perspective.
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Jarvie, I.C. (1987). The Objectivity of Criticism of the Arts. In: Agassi, J., Jarvie, I.C. (eds) Rationality: The Critical View. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3491-7_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3491-7_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-247-3455-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-3491-7
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