Abstract
So far I have referred to the four levels which the moral phenomenon can be broken down into for the purposes of studying its relation with certain causally explicable determinants. In this chapter I am going to abandon this shall we say formal perspective in order to make clear some of the consequences of using a theory of ethics like the one proposed, and their significance for certain theses about the relation between biology and morals as stated by Hayek. The ideological content of determinism in moral matters as proposed by sociobiology has probably had the greatest echo within the critiques and commentaries by specialists from the social sciences, or simply by philosophers. So far I have not referred to these aspects, since as I have already maintained they seem to me to be paradigmatically separable from the body of theory itself and peripheral to its acceptance or denial. Moreover, within the theory discussed here there is a sufficient level of beta-moral autonomy to allow the idea of moral behaviour based exclusively on instinctive impulses to be left aside. By the same token, I must point out that if Social Darwinism today seems worthless, it is due to its scant explanatory value and not because it might lead to fascist-type excesses.
If modern man finds that his inborn instincts do not always lead him in the right direction, he at least flatters himself that it was his reason which made him recognize that a different kind of conduct will serve his innate values better. The conception that man has, in the service of his innate desires, consciously constructed an order of society is, however, erroneous, because without the cultural evolution which lies between instinct and the capacity of rational design he would not have possessed the reason which now makes him try to do so. Man did not adopt new rules of conduct because he was intelligent. He became intelligent by submitting to new rules of conduct. The most important insight which so many rationalists still resist and are even inclined to brand as a superstition, namely that man has not only never invented his most beneficial institutions, from language to morals and law, and even today does not yet understand why he should preserve them when they satisfy neither his instincts nor his reason, still needs to be emphasized. The basic tools of civilization — language, morals, law and money — are all the result of spontaneous growth and not of design, and of the last two organized power has got hold and thoroughly corrupted them. F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1979)
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Notes
Classic models of this type were of course abundant in the last century with the rise of innatism. Those of Cesare Lombroso The Man of Genius (1891) and Sir Francis Galton, Darwin’s cousin Hereditary Genius (1892) are well known. Today the controversy runs along somewhat different channels which do not bear too close a relation to what I am trying to argue here (such as Eysenck’s theses). The interested reader can turn in any case either to the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition or to the acts of symposia such as the one held in Toronto in (1969) (W. B. Dockrell, ed. On Intelligence 1970), or the 7th Hyman Blumberg symposium (J. C. Stanley, W. C. George and C. H. Solano, eds., The Gifted and the Creative: A fifty-year perspective); etc. See also W. Dennis and M. W. Dennis (eds), The Intellectually Gifted (1976) and
Pieter A. Vroon, Intelligence. On Myths and Measurement (1980). In my view the most interesting perspective is that established by John Hartung when he considers the relations between natural selection and the inheritance of wealth, understanding by wealth a wide set of resources, talents and status able to increase the reproductive success of whoever possesses them (‘On Natural Selection and the Inheritance of Wealth’ 1976, p. 607).
Hartung, especially in the explanation he gives to critics of his article, presents an idea of the interaction between cultural norms, inherited conducts and natural selection which was then widely discussed in the sociobiological context and not always as clearly as in Hartung (op. cit. p. 619) See also J. Hartung, ‘Paternity and the inheritance of wealth’ (1981).
See Francisco J. Ayala, ‘The Concept of Biological Progress’ (1974) on the criteria which permit progress in biology to be defined.
See the concept of autotrophism in Faustino Cordón (1981) Chapter IV.
The interested reader can refer to my article ‘Tres tesis falaces de la ideología liberal’ (1982).
Although it had already been pointed out by Konrad Lorenz (1963) Chapter XIII.
Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. III (1979), p. 164.
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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Cela-Conde, C.J. (1987). Adversus Liberales: The Right to Excellence and Distributive Justice. In: On Genes, Gods and Tyrants. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3389-7_9
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