Moral Progress

Abstract

The way in which the criterion of what is right or wrong in ethical matters is justified in, shall we say, orhodox Marxist theory refers rather nebulously to the working class, and consequently has to bear accusations of fallacious naturalism. But Engel’s text opens a new and interesting possibility, although of an eschato-logical nature, by alerting us to the advent of ‘truly human’ morals. That these morals should coincide with those of the working class, boosted by its political triumph, is something we can leave aside. The fact is that Engels accepts, even though he does not explain why, the existence of historical moral progress. Must we assume that the arrival of truly human morals will mean the end of such progress? Or, on the contrary, will growth in this sense continue to exist? And if so, under what conditions will we know that a given variation in ethical values signifies progress, if, by definition, the class antagonism which indirectly produced the criterion of choice no longer exists?

As society has always moved in class antagonism, morals have always been class morals, either they have justified the power and interests of the dominant class, or, since the oppressed class became strong enough to do so, they have represented revolt against that domination, and the interests of the future of the oppressed. There can be no doubt that overall moral progress has been produced, as in all branches of human knowledge. But we have still not overcome class morals. Truly human morals, above social class antagonisms and its legacies, will only be possible in a society which has not only overcome, but in practice has actually forgotten conflict between social classes. F. Engels, Anti-Duhring