Abstract
Public policy failings, not bank mismanagement, caused the 1930–33 banking collapse. These public policy failings unnecessarily exposed the American banking system to excessive monetary and structural risks in the absence of which the banking system would not have collapsed. To make this case, this paper is divided into three major sections. The first establishes a framework to explain why the banking collapse occurred. The second applies this framework to American banking history from 1920 to the 1933 bank holiday. The paper closes with seven lessons for today that can be drawn from this research.
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© 1988 The Casto Institute
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Ely, B. (1988). The Big Bust: The 1930–33 Banking Collapse—Its Causes, Its Lessons. In: England, C., Huertas, T. (eds) The Financial Services Revolution. Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7971-6
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