Abstract
Catherine England (1987) argues that in an unregulated banking system without deposit insurance, various services and institutions would evolve to do what many people now think must be done by government. These new services and institutions would protect innocent bank customers from unscrupulous or inefficient bankers who otherwise would use depositors’ funds for unsound or illegal investments, and would protect innocent banks from the contagious effects of other banks’ failures.
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References
David, Paul A. “Understanding the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History.” In Economic History and the Modern Economist, pp. 30–49. Edited by W. N. Parker. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986.
England, Catherine. “Agency Costs and Unregulated Banks: Could Depositors Protect Themselves?” Chapter 14 in this book.
Gould, Stephen Jay. “The Panda’s Thumb of Technology.” Natural History (January 1987): 14–23.
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© 1988 The Casto Institute
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James Meigs, A. (1988). Evolution in Banking. In: England, C., Huertas, T. (eds) The Financial Services Revolution. Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7971-6
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