Abstract
No one issue has so dominated the landscape of contemporary philosophy of science as has the “problem of incommensurability” of scientific theories, so named by Kuhn and Feyerabend in 1962. The “problem of incommensurability” in fact comprises several interrelated problems, among which are: logical compatibility and comparability, justification and validity, meaning, rationality, and progress. My concern here is with incommensurability of meaning. Succinctly put, the problem, as posed by Kuhn and Feyerabend, is this: If a scientific concept derives its meaning from its place within a theoretical network (T) and a substantial change of theory occurs (T′), then the interconnections among meanings of the concepts (including the introduction of new concepts) change. It is this “meaning variance” in cases of theory change which causes the “problem of incommensurability of meaning”: How can the adherents of theory T and those of theory T′ communicate with one another since, in a very real sense, they are speaking different languages?
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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Nersessian, N.J. (1989). Scientific Discovery and Commensurability of Meaning. In: Gavroglu, K., Goudaroulis, Y., Nicolacopoulos, P. (eds) Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 111. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3025-4_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3025-4_23
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