Partial Interpretation, Meaning Variance, and Incommensurability

Abstract

According to philosophical folklore the thesis that theories partially define their own terms entails the thesis of meaning-variance. Meaning variance in turn is supposed to lead to the thesis of incommensurability, or at least pose severe problems for commensurability. And the incommensurability thesis goes hand-in-glove with anti-realism. The aim of this paper is to show that these purported links do not exist. But the mere contemplation of incommensurability has tempted so many more able philosophers into a swamp of confusion that it might be prudent to chart the logical geography of the territory before setting out. It has to be admitted that the map I offer has some novel features, and swamp-lovers may well object that those very features make the going too easy. I thus recommend its use only to lazy travellers who value firm ground and a well-marked path.