Buchdahl and Rorty on Kant and the History of Philosophy

Abstract

Richard Rorty’s recent challenges to the professional philosopher flow from his distinctive interpretation of the modern tradition. He argues that its deepest and most questionable presupposition is the notion of the mind as a mirror of nature — a notion that requires “deconstruction” if philosophy is to return to the good faith of its ancient role. Against Rorty I argue that his programme cannot be sustained in the context of his account of Kant. I draw upon Buchdahl’s reading of the Kantian text which seems to offer an alternative “constructivist” path between the extremes of foundationalism and relativism. Buchdahl’s idea of philosophy as a multi-levelled and hermeneutic enterprise underpins his model of the structure of Kant’s thought. In turn this model facilitates an interpretation that cuts though a number of the Gordian knots that have obsessed Kant scholars — particularly those of the “thing-in-itself” and of the concept of matter. On closer inspection there may be little here that Rorty’s pragmatism can dispute.