Abstract
Of the three points made by L.J. Cohen, I shall consider two: his refutation of irrealism and his argument that van Fraassen’s version of irrealism is subject to the same difficulties van Fraassen has found with realism.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Zemach, E.M. (1988). Epistemic and Semantic Reflections on Scientific Realism. In: Ullmann-Margalit, E. (eds) Science in Reflection. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 110. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-2713-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2957-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive