Abstract
The most delicate problem raised by Gad Freudenthal is that mentioned in his conclusion, namely, the possibility of overcoming the relativism to which the hermeneutical circle seems to lead. Not only is it the most delicate problem — it is also the most decisive point. Indeed, the attempt to circumscribe this possibility in the framework of Hélène Metzger’s contributions is not in itself limited to conjectures as to what she really did or really thought: it is far more. It involves, as I would like to show here in following Freudenthal’s line of argument, a tentative approach to a question which is of paramount importance for the status and fate of the history and philosophy of science in general.
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References
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Kerszberg, P. (1988). The Hermeneutical Status of the History of Science: The Views of Hélène Metzger. In: Ullmann-Margalit, E. (eds) Science in Reflection. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 110. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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