Abstract
Ed Gettier showed that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge.1 Not all epistemologists these days will agree that justified true belief is necessary for knowledge but I hope that most will agree with the following more modest proposal: at least one minimally sufficient condition for knowledge has justified true belief as a necessary part. At any rate, I will assume that this is so in what follows. The problem of the fourth condition (also widely and appropriately known as the Gettier problem) can then be stated as follows: What must be added to justified true belief to make a minimally sufficient condition for knowledge? Of course, we want a minimally sufficient condition that is non-trivial, informative.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Ginet, C. (1988). The Fourth Condition. In: Austin, D.F. (eds) Philosophical Analysis. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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