Abstract
The value of work on the Gettier Problem has been called into question. Michael Williams concludes a paper on this dark note: “That anything important turns on coming up with a solution to Gettier’s problem remains to be shown.”1 Mark Kaplan argues for a gloomier view: “My message is that it is time to stop and face the unpleasant reality that we simply have no use for a definition of propositional knowledge.”2
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Notes
Michael Williams [1978], ‘Inference, Justification and the Analysis of Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy LXXV (May) p. 263.
Mark Kaplan [1985], ‘It’s Not What You Know that Counts,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXXXII (July) p. 363.
Williams [1978], pp. 249–250.
Ibid., pp. 250–262. Harman responds in Harman [1978], ‘Using Intuitions about Reasoning to Study Reasoning: A Reply to Williams’, The Journal of Philosophy LXXV (August) pp. 433–483.
Kaplan [1985], pp. 352–353.
Ibid., p. 353.
Ibid., pp. 354–356.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Conee, E. (1988). Why Solve the Gettier Problem?. In: Austin, D.F. (eds) Philosophical Analysis. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_4
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