Justification and the Gettier Problem

  • Robert G. Meyers
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 38)


As we have just seen, to know something inferentially is to have a true justified belief about it. It is unlikely, however, that these conditions are jointly sufficient. For one thing, a person can have a true justified belief yet not believe because of his justification, but rather for some other frivolous reason. There must, in order words, be an appropriate causal condition between a person’s “best reasons” and his belief. This is a relatively trivial point, however, and could be easily incorporated into the conditions offered in the last chapter. We merely have to add that, in addition to having a justified true belief that p, the person must believe because of his justification. A more interesting reason for thinking true justified belief is not sufficient for knowledge is posed by the Gettier problem and the myriad examples it has spawned (Gettier, 1963). This problem underlines some of the difficulties in trying to defend a fallibilist conception of knowledge in detail.


Justify Belief Gettier Case True Justify Belief False Proposition False Premiss 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert G. Meyers
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySUNY at AlbanyUSA

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