Certainty and Sensations
In some ways certainty about sensations is a more complicated issue than certainty about necessary truths or our own existence. Since there has been greater controversy about sensations, the infallibilist’s position tends to be more refined; there are also more arguments and counterarguments. It is not possible to do justice to all the issues here or even to sort them out in a few pages. In order to deal with what I take to be the central points, I will consider first the main objection to the infallibilist’s claim and, in the next section, attempt to sort out some of the standard objections that infallibilists have made to this line of argument. Finally, I will consider a modal restatement of the infallibilist position that has been discussed widely in the recent literature, namely, the claim that propositions about sensations (“basic” propositions) are incorrigible.
KeywordsSense Quality Analytic Truth Verbal Error Basic Proposition Propositional Element
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