Naturalism, Dialectical Materialism, and an Ontology of Constitutive Relations

Abstract

The thesis to be explored here is that the traditions of naturalism and dialectical materialism, extending from Dewey and Marx respectively -despite their many important dissimilarities — have at least this much in common: both philosophic views, at the level of ontological generality, require a concept of constitutive relations which sets them apart from most other traditional and contemporary philosophic schools. In itself there is nothing novel about this suggestion. Two of the most important recent and contemporary representatives of the American naturalist position, John H. Randall Jr. and Justus Buchler, have each made substantial contributions toward a theory of relations consonant with the general perspective of that school of thought.¹ While much less work of this land has been done in the context of dialectical materialism, it has been suggested more than once that the tradition is in need of a more thorough-going concept of relations.² This need has arisen, for both schools of thought, as a result of the general concept of nature characteristic of each. While naturalism and dialectical materialism do not have identical conceptions of nature, each understands it in ways which render the more traditional Western ideas of substance, attributes and external relations insufficient.