Abstract
In chapter three we had occasion to examine the interrelationship in the works of Vasubandhu of his inclinations towards phenomenalism and nominalism, and the Buddhist theory of two truths. In the context of that discussion the claim was made that Vasubandhu’s work had an influence on Dinnāga. One area in which the influence of Vasubandhu upon Dinnāga is especially apparent is in his appreciation of a phenomenalistic view according to which we cannot directly know the external world and according to which it is possible for people to have experiences even in the absence of external stimuli. What was shown to follow from this view was that both words that name complexes and words that name absolute simples can in fact be naming only concepts as opposed to things of the world as they might be independent of our experience. These ideas were explored in various ways by Vasubandhu, as we saw briefly in chapter three. In the present chapter we shall see that Dinnāga also took up these themes, but that he invoked arguments that differed somewhat from those that Vasubandhu had used. We shall begin with a discussion of Dinnāga’s phenomenalism as discussed in his short and relatively simple treatise called Ālambanaparikfṣā, and then we shall turn to the elaborate arguments for nominalism that appear in his most mature work, the Pramāna-samuccaya.
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Notes
Chapter 5. Dinnāga’s nominalism
Abhidharmakośa 6.4. In Vasubandhu 1972 ed., p. 889. yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat ghatāmbuvat samvrtisat paramārthasad anyathā
Vasubandhu 1972 ed., p. 80: “kah punar visayālambanayor viśes0323ah0323. yasmin yasya karitram sa tasya visayah. yac cittacaittair grhyate tad ālambanam.”
What I have offered here is a paraphrase of the information contained in Yaśomitra’s commentary to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in Vasubandhu 1970 ed., p. 80. The passage from which this information has been gleaned is: “yasmin yasya kāritram0307 sa tasya viṣaya iti. kāritram puruṣakāraḥ. cakṣuḥśrotrādīnāṁ rūpaśabdadiṣv ālocanaśravaṇādi kāritram. tac ca svacittacaittān pratyāśrayabhāvaśaktiviśeṣalakṣaṇaṁ veditavyam. yac cittacaittair grhyate daṇdāvastambhanayogena yac cittacaittair grhyate rūpādi. tad evam sati cittacaittānām evālambanam. viṣayaḥ punaś cakṣurādīnām api, na kevalaṁ cittacaittānām.”
The Sanskrit original of the Alambanaparīkṣā does not survive, but of relatively classical versions of the text there are one Tibetan and three Chinese translations. My translation here is based upon the text of the Tibetan translation of the Ālambanaparīkṣāvrtti as edited by Tola and Dragonetti 1982:120–123. Another edition of this anonymous Tibetan translation appears in Frauwallner 1959b: 157–161. Tola and Dragonetti’s study of the text, like Frauwallner’s, records all the Sanskrit fragments that have been found cited in still extant Sanskrit works. Their study also includes an annotated English translation of the verses with Dinnāga’s own prose commentary. Their translation is rather cumbersome, but their study of the next is informative, although flawed by an outdated interpretation of Dinnāga’s position as one of subjective idealism. A somewhat smoother English translation appears in Sastri 1942, which also has a translation of extracts from the commentary by Vinītadeva. There is also an English translation of just the verse text of Alambanaparīkṣā in Way man 1979, and although his translation itself is relatively poor, Wayman’s depiction of Dinnāga’s overall philosophical stance is on the whole better informed than depictions found in other English works on the subject. To my mind the clearest rendering of the text is the translation into French by Yamaguchi 1929, which also benefits by references to the Chinese versions and translations of Vinītadeva’s commentary.
The Sanskrit for this verse has survived. It reads: yady aplndriyavijñapteh kāranarh paramānavah atadābhatayā nāsyā akṣavad viṣayo ‘ṇavaḥ.
Vākyapadlya 1:30–31: na cāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭjiate rṣīnām apy āgamapūrvakam dharmasya cāvyavacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ na tāṁllokaprasiddhatvāt kaácit tarkeṇa bādhate
Vākyapadlya 1:40: idam puṇyam idam pāpam ity etasmin padadvaye ācaṇḍālam manuṣyāṇām alpaṁ śāstraprayojanam
Vākyapadlya 1:36 and 1:38: pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca vyatikramya vyavasthitāḥ pitṛrakṣaḥpiaācānāṁ karmajā eva siddhayaḥ atīndriyān asamvedyām paáyanty ārṣeṇa cakṣuṣā ye bhāvān vacanaṁ teṣāṁ nānumānena bādhyate
Vākyapadīya 1:32–34: avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā nirjñātaśakter dravyasya tāṁ tāṁ arthakriyām prati viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate yatnenānumito ’py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhih abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate
Patañjali 1880 ed.,p. 1
The discussion occurs at Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:17–18. See also 2:16.
The principal passage from which I am extracting this argument is Pramānasamuccaya 5:18. As can be seen by looking at the translation of that passage, it is very compact and requires much expansion. There is, therefore, a need for caution in following my interpretation.
See Pramāṇasamuccaya 2:13.
This issue comes up for discussion at Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:50.
See Cardona 1967:336–338 and 345–348.
See Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:2ab: “na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyavyabhicāratah vācakaḥ.” In this statement “ānantya” rules out a word’s expressing the totality of particulars to which it applies, and “vyabhicāra” rules out a word’s picking out only part of its domain.
See Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:2cd and Din0307nāga’s own commentary thereto.
A discussion of the arguments used by Dinnāga is to be found in Matilal 1968.
See Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:8cd and 9cd-10a.
Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:9ab.
Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:4a and its commentary.
The particular problems of interpretation will be dealt with in my own commentary to the translation of Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:4b-8b below in chapter 7.
Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:4b.
My presentation here follows Jinendrabuddhi’s analysis of Pramāṇasamuccaya 5:7b.
Pramāṇasamuccaya 1:3d. See also the discussion above, p. 134.
Matilal 1971:37.
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Hayes, R.P. (1988). Diṅnāga’s nominalism. In: Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs. Studies of Classical India, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2_5
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