Abstract
In taking technical terminology from one philosophical tradition and applying it to ideas that occur in another, there is always some risk of being misunderstood. In order to reduce that risk somewhat it may be advisable to compare how the terminology evolved in the tradition from which it is being borrowed and to point out differences between that tradition and the tradition to which the borrowed terminology is being applied. In the previous chapter an attempt was made to clarify in what sense the term “skepticism” might be applied to the whole enterprise of Buddhist theory and practice. In this section, and in later parts of this work, I shall be borrowing another term from Western philosophy and applying it to the context within which Indian Buddhist thought evolved. The term in question is “nominalism,” and it is now incumbent upon me to clarify how this term came to be used in the history of Western thought so that we shall have some basis upon which to compare the family of issues to which the term belongs in the Western tradition with their cousins in the Indian tradition of philosophy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Fowler 1914 tr., p. 19.
Fowler 1914 tr., p. 21.
Cooper (1941 tr., p. 174) renders “eidos” by “ideal form” in his translation of the Euthyphro.
Republic 596. Shorey 1930 tr, p. 820.
I owe this summary of Plato’s theory of knowledge to Copleston 1946a, pp. 173–178, whose lucid discussion I am abridging and simplifying considerably.
Metaphysics 980a in Ross 1941 tr., p.689.
A discussion of the technical terminology used by Aristotle is found in Richard Hope’s translation of the Metaphysics. Encoded into this translation are frequent indications of the exact terminology used. I have profited in this discussion of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato by comparing three translations: Tredennick 1933 and 1935, which also contain the Greek text, Ross 1941, and Hope 1952. All indications of the standard Latin translations of Aristotle’s Greek that occur in my discussion were taken from the glossary of Hope’s translation.
Metaphysics Gamma 1003a in Ross 1941 tr., p. 731–732.
Metaphysics Alpha 990b in Ross 1941 tr., pp. 706 ff. An account of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s theory also appears in Copleston 1946b, pp. 35 ff.
Metaphysics Alpha Minor 994a in Ross 1941 tr., p. 713.
Metaphysics Beta 1001a in Ross 1941 tr., p. 727–728.
Metaphysics Beta 1003a in Ross 1941 tr., p. 731.
Metaphysics Zeta 1034a in Ross 1941 tr., p. 795.
Gilson 1955, p. 487.
Loux 1974 tr., p. 79.
Loux 1974 tr., p. 81.
An account of Ockham’s views on how the intellect acquires abstract notions appears in Gilson 1955, p. 495.
Warder 1970:164.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed., pp. 117–118) Tesaṁ vo ‘ham vyakkhissaṁ Vāseṭṭhā ti Bhagavā anupubbaṁ yathatathaṁ jātivibhaṅgaṁ pānānaṁ, aññamaññā hi jātiyo. Tiṇarukkhe pi jānātha, na cāpi paṭijānare, liṅgaṁ jātimayaṁ tesaṁ, aññamaññā hi jātiyo. Tato kīte pataṅ ge ca yāva kunthakipillike, liṅgaṁ jātimayam tesaṁ, aññamaññā hi jātiyo.
This argument is found in Sutta Nipāta Vāsetthasutta verses 607–619. The text of this sutta, also entitled Vāseṭṭhasutta, also occurs as sutta 98 of the Majjhima Nikāya, volume 2.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed., p. 119) Paccattaṁ sasarīresu manusesv-etaṁ na vijjati vokārañ ca manussesu samññāya pavuccati This rather terse statement is difficult to translate gracefully. Other attempts have expressed generally the same sentiment as mine and should be looked at for the purposes of comparison. Fausböll (1881 tr., pp. 110–111): “Difference there is in beings endowed with bodies, but amongst men this is not the case, the difference amongst men is nominal (only).” Norman (1984 tr., p. 104): “This (difference) is not found individually among men in respect of their bodies, but among men difference is spoken of as a matter of designation.” Horner (1957 tr., p. 382): “Nothing unique is in men’s bodies found: The difference in men is nominal.”
The Pāli and Sanskrit word “jāti” most literally means birth, as does the Latin “natura.” Eventually, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, “jāti” becomes a philosophical technical term that comes very close in meaning to what in European philosophy is called a “universal.”
Oldenberg 1929 ed., p. 13: “rūpam bhikkhave anattā, rūpañ ca h’ idam bhikkhave attā abhavissa, na yidam rūpam ābādhāya samvatteyya, labbhetha ca rūpe evam me rūpaṁ hotu, evaṁ me rūpaṁ mā ahosīti. yasmā ca kho bhikkhave rūpaṁ anattā, tasmā rūpaṁ ābādhāya samvattati, na ca labbhati rūpe evaṁ me rūpaṁ hotu, evaṁ me rūpaṁ mā ahosīti.”
A good review of the Indian Buddhist literature on the question of the self appears in Krishan 1984, where there is also some discussion of what modern scholars have said about the philosophical difficulties involved in the traditional Buddhist position. An article that contains a good deal of information on the controversy among modern scholars on how to interpret the early Buddhist position on the self is Ching 1984.
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 182: “Tassa yā purimā kāma-saññā sā nirujjhati. Vivekaja-pītisukha-sukhuma-sacca-saṇṇā tasmiṁ samaye hoti, vivekaja-pītisukha-sukhuma-sacca-saṇṇī yeva tasmiṁ samaye hoti. Evam pi sikhā ekā saññā uppajjanti, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhanti.”
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 185: “Yathā yathā kho Poṭṭhapāda nirodhaṁ phusati, tathā tathā ‘haṁ saññaggaṁ paññāpemi, evam kho ahaṁ Poṭṭhapāda ekaṁ pi saññaggam paññapemi, puthu pi saññagge paññapemīti.”
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 185: “Kim pana tvaṁ Poṭṭhapāda attānam paccesi?”
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 191: “Sabbe va kho ete Poṭṭhapāda paribbājakā andhā acakkhukā, tvaṁ yeva nesaṁ eko cakkhumā, ekaṅsikā pi hi kho Poṭṭhapāda mayā dhammā desitā paññattā, anekansikā pi hi kho Poṭṭhapāda mayā dhammā desitā paññattā.”
Buddhaghosa (1931 ed., p. 381) glosses “mogha” with “tuccha,” which means empty or deserted. He then says that the intention of this statement is that when one pays attention to the oneself as physical body, the self as mind-stuff stops being present.
Poṭṭhapāda Sutta 53. Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 202.
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 202: “Itimā kho Citta loka-samaññā loka-niruttiyo loka-vohārā loka-paññattiyo yāhi Tathāgato voharati aparāmasan ti.”
Buddhaghosa 1931 ed., p. 383.
Trenckner 1880 ed., p. 25: “Nāgaseno ti kho aham mahārāja ñāyāmi… api ca matapitaro nāmam karonti Nāgaseno ti vā Sūraseno ti vā Vīraseno ti vā Sīhaseno ti vā, api ca kho mahārāja sankhā samaññā paññatti vohāro nāmamattam yad-idam Nāgaseno ti, na h’ettha puggalo upalabbhatīti.”
Conze 1962:239.
Reported in David Kelly, “Go playful into that good night,” The New York Times Book Review, January 18, 1987. p. 15.
Suzuki 1953:274.
Conze 1962:261.
Conze 1980:45. The excessive dread that Conze held of Aristotle in general and the law of contradiction in particular, which Conze argues was almost imposed upon the Greeks by Aristotle’s fiat and displaced a much more spiritually awakened way of thinking in pre-Aristotelian Greek thought, is but one instance of the phenomenon, which at one time had widespread occurrence among Western students of Buddhist thought, of panic in the face of rationality. Just why this was so would make an interesting study in itself and would reveal much about the history of the rather distorted and romanticized view of Buddhism that still prevails among some intellectuals and among many anti-intellectuals in the West.
Suzuki 1953:277
Suzuki 1953:292
Kassapa 1961 ed., p. 39. khandesu bhijjamānesu, so ce bhijjati puggalo ucchedā bhavati diṭṭhi, yā buddhena vivajjitā khandesu bhijjamānesu, no ce bhijjati puggalo puggalo sassato hoti, nibbānena samasamo ti
Suzuki (1953:261) offers this summary of the gist of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy: “According to Nāgārjuna, all dharmas are endowed with these characters: existentiality, intelligibility, perceptibility, objectivity, efficiency, causality, dependence, mutuality, duality, multiplicity, generality, individuality, etc. But all these characterizations have no permanence, no stability; they are all relative and phenomenal. The ignorant fail to see into the true nature of things, and become attached thereby to the idea of a reality which is eternal, blissful, self-governing, and devoid of defilements. To be wise simply means to be free from these false views, for there is nothing in them to be taken hold of as not empty.”
La Vallée Poussin (1937:159) says “L’importance du problème des deux vérités, vérité de saṁvṛti ou d’apparence, vérité de paramārtha ou vérité absolue, est grande dans le Grand Véhicule, dans le Vedānta, dans la spéculations indienne en général, et, on peut dire, dans la philosophie universelle.”
La Vallée Poussin 1937:160.
The term “āsrava” is one of the most difficult technical terms in Buddhist thought to translate smoothly into English. Among the translations that have been used for this technical term by English translators are “depravity,” “impurity,” “intoxicant” and “outflow.”
Abhidharmakośa 7.2. In Vasubandhu 1967 ed., p. 391.
Abhidharmakośa 6.4. In Vasubandhu 1972 ed., p. 889.
yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat
ghaṭāmbuvat saṁvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā
La Vallée Poussin (1923 tr. vol. 4, p. 141) seems to render the phrase “rasārhān dharmān apohya buddhyā” as if it read “rasādīn dharmān apohya buddhyā,” for he translates the phrase as “en retirer par l’esprit la saveur et les autres dharmas” Perhaps the error lay in Xuanzang’s translation into Chinese, which La Vallée Poussin was following since the Sanskrit text of Abhidharmakośa had not yet been rediscovered when he made his French translation. I have taken the Sanskrit text as it stands, construing “rasārha” in the sense of fit for experience, or capable of being experienced, or sensible. The term “rasa” is quite often used in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit in the sense of experience in general rather than in the sense of flavour in particular, and I see no reason why in this context special attention would be drawn to taste (saveur) as opposed to any other sensible property.
Vasubandhu 1972 ed., p. 890: yasminn avayavaśo bhinne na tadbuddhir bhavati tat samvṛtisat. tadyathā ghaṭaḥ. tatra hi kapālaśo bhinne ghaṭabuddhir na bhavati. yatra cānyān apohya dharmān buddhyā tadbuddhir na bhavati, taccāpi saṁvṛtisad veditavyam. tadyathā ambu. tatra hi buddhyā rūpādin dharmān apohyāmbubuddhir na bhavati. Teṣv eva tu saṁvṛtisaṁjñā kṛteti saṁvṛtivaśāt ghaṭāmbu cāstīti bruvantaḥ satyam evāhur na mṛṣā. ity etat samvṛtisatyam. ato anyathā paramārthasatyam. tatra bhinne’pi tadbuddhir bhavaty eva. anyadharmāpohe ‘pi buddhyā tat paramārthasat. tadyathā rūpam, tatra hi paramāṇubhinne vastuni rasārhān api ca dharmān apohya buddhyā rūpasya svabhāve buddhir bhavaty eva. evaṁ vedanādayo ‘pi draṣṭavyāḥ.
This view is argued in Singh 1984. An earlier version of a theory that there were two Vasubandhus was put forward in several works by Erich Frauwallner (1951, 1958, and 1961), but the basis of Frauwallner’s hypothesis was that the Buddhist tradition records two separate dates for the life of Vasubandhu. In order to reconcile this controversy over the date of Vasubandhu’s life, Frauwallner suggested that there were in fact two great Buddhist masters by the same name who lived at different times. The later of these two Vasubandhus, according to Frauwallner, composed both the Abhidharmakośa and some of the key works of the Yogācāra school. For an account of the key differences between Frauwallner’s two-Vasubandhu hypothesis and Singh’s, see Hayes 1986c.
Shastri 1964:41.
Shastri 1964:42–43.
Shastri 1964:59.
An edition of the Twenty Stanzas (Viṁśikāvṛtti) of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi appears in Anacker 1984 tr., p. 413. The portion that I have translated here reads: “mahāyāne traidhātukaṁ vijñaptimātraṁ vyavasthāpyate. cittamātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrāt. cittaṁ mano vijñānaṁ vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāh. cittam atra sasaṁprayogam abhipretam. mātram ity arthapratisedhārtham.”
Hall 1986:14.
Hall 1986:18. Emphasis mine.
Anderson and Smith 1913 ed., p. 147:Ye ca rūpūpagā sattā ye ca āruppavāsino
nirodhaṁ appajānantā, āgantāro punabbhavaṁ Ye ca rūpe pariññāya arūpesu susanthitā
nirodhe ye vimuccanti, te janā maccuhāyino
Anacker (1984 tr., p. 76–77, n. 12) sketches out a brief history of the Buddhist notion of the two and three realms that is essentially like the one I have outlined here.
Kochumuttom (1982:165) makes much of the fact that the word “traidhātukam” is an adjective rather than a noun and must therefore modify some noun. But, he observes, there is no noun explicitly stated in the sentence, so it should be understood from context that the noun to be supplied is “cittam.” The importance he places on this set of observations is that when Vasubandhu says the traidhātuka is nothing but vijñapti, he means that the whole realm of subjective experience or thought is made up only of “representations of consciousness,” which is his translation of the term “vijñapti” Hall (1986:22, n.23) feels that Kochumuttom’s rendering reduces the entire statement to a tautology saying nothing more interesting than that all subjective experience is subjective. Hall prefers, therefore, to treat “traidhātukam” as a substantival adjective, since, as he correctly points out, words that are formally adjectives can readily stand alone as nouns in Sanskrit without any clearly implied noun to serve as that which the adjective modifies. My own inclination is to side with Hall in this dispute over the grammar of the sentence and to leave the referent of “what is derived from the three elements” deliberately vague.
Vaidya 1963 ed., p.34: pudgalaḥ saṁtatiḥ skandhāḥ pratyayā aṇavas tathāpradhānam īśvaraḥ kartā cittamātraṁ vikalpyate
Many translators treat the term “lokottaram” as referring to something supramundane. Such a translation can be somewhat misleading, for it seems to suggest to some ears that which is supernatural. But all that “lokottara” implies is that which is superior (uttara) to what is found among ordinary folks (loka), or that which is superior to the foolish masses of people (bālaputhujjanā) and their preoccupations with the eight folk characteristics (lokadharma), namely the longing to gain and the dread of being deprived of property, comfort, fame and praise.
Originally a muni was a mendicant who had taken a vow of silence. Silence came to be regarded as the mark of a wise person. The Buddha Gautama, despite his many conversations and talks, was noted for his silence and composure and came to be called by his followers the Great Muni. Given his aversion to the formation of opinions, and given that when one abandons opinions there is much less to say, “muni” was probably an epithet that was deliberately chosen for its connotations of silence. In this same sentence the word “dharma” has the double sense of property or attribute and of teaching or doctrine. The Sanskrit for these three verses appears in Anacker 1984 tr, p. 423: yadālambanam vijñānam naivoplabhate tādā sthitaṁ vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrāhāt acitto ‘nuplambho ‘sau jñānaṁ lokottaraṁ ca tat āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dausthalyahānitah sa evānasravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ sukho vimuktikāyo ‘yaṁ mahāmuneḥ
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hayes, R.P. (1988). Nominalism in Pre-Diṅnāgan Buddhism. In: Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs. Studies of Classical India, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7806-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2899-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive