Abstract
What I shall try to show in the present chapter and in the following chapter is that there are two currents present in Buddhist canonical literature from the very beginning and that these two currents are also predominant in the philosophical writings of early Mahāyāna systematizers such as Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu. The first of these currents is a kind of skeptical rationalism according to which there is no knowledge aside from that which meets the test of logical consistency, and moreover very few of our beliefs meet this test. And the second is a form of nominalism, according to which universals are not features of the external world that exist independently of our awareness of the world but rather are born of the attempts of awareness itself to organize the data of sense experience. In later chapters I shall be trying to show that these two currents are the principal currents in Diṅnāgan’s system of thought as well. My motive in showing this is not to support the conclusion that Diṅnāgan had nothing new to say on the these issues or that he was doing nothing more than drawing out in full detail the implications of earlier Buddhist dogmatics. Nor is my motive to deny that Diṅnāgan was heavily influenced by non-Buddhist sources, for I am convinced by the evidence adduced by Frauwallner and by R. Herzberger that Diṅnāgan did indeed owe a great debt to Bhartrhari and to the whole tradition of the Sanskrit grammarians.
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Notes
In the notes that follow the text of the Sutta Nipāta as established by Andersen and Smith (1913 ed., pp. 156–158) is given. In order to facilitate the comparison of my translation with those of others, the Pāli is followed by the translation of Fausböll (1881 tr., p. 148–149) and the translation of Norman (1984 tr., p. 135). Comparing the different translations will reveal how rich in suggestion, and how difficult of precise interpretation, these verses are.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): Yad attanī passati ānisamsam diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mutẹ vā, tad eva so tattha samuggahāya nihīhato passati sabbam annam.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): Tam vāpi gantham kusalā vadanti, yam nissito passati hīnam annam, tasmā hi diṭṭhirh va sutam mutam vā sīlabbatam bhikkhu na nissayeyya.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): Diṭṭhim pi lokasmim na kappayeyya Nāṅena vā sīlavatena vā pi. ‘samo’ ti attānam anūpaneyya ‘hīno’ na mannetha ‘visesi’ vā pi.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): Attam pahāya anupādiyāno ṅāṅe pi so nissayam no karoti, sā ve viyattesu na vaggasārī, diṭṭhim pi so na pacceti kiṅci.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): yassūbhayante panidhidha n’atthi bhāvābhavāya idha vā huram vā nivesanā tassa na santi keci dhammesu niccheyya samuggahītā
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): tassīdha diṭṭhe va sute mutẹ vā pakappitā n’ atthi aṅū pi sanna: tam brāhmaṅam diṭṭhim anādiyāna kenīdha lokasmim vikappayeyya.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): Na kappayanti na purekkharonti, dhammā pa tesam na patticchitāse, na brāhmaṅo sīlavatena neyyo, pāramgato na pacceti tādī ti.
Further passages in the Sutta Nipāta that make this point are verses 824–828, 832–834, 837–841, and 879–914.
Andersen and Smith (1913 ed.): Sannavirattassa na santi ganthā, pannāvimuttassa na santi mohā: sannan ca diṭṭhin ca ye aggahesum, te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke.
Brahmajāla sutta, 1:28, Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 12. Here the Buddha says: “Atthi bhikkave ann’ eva dhammā gambhīrā duddasā duranubodhā santā panitā atakkāvacarā nipuṅā pandita-vedanīyā, ye Tathāgato sayam abhinna sacchikatvā pavedeti, yehi Tathāgatassa yathā-bhuccam vannam sammā vadamānā vadeyyum. Katame ca pana te bhikkave dhammā gambirā…vadeyyum?”
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 30: “Tayidam, bhikkave, Tathāgato pajānāti: ‘Ime ditthiṭṭhānā evam-gahitā evam-parāmatthā evam-gatikā bhavissanti evam-abhisamparāyā ti.’”
Brahmajāla sutta 3:72. See Davids 1899 tr., p. 54.
See Brahmajāla sutta 3:21. Here the opinion that is being put in the mouth of some teachers is that while pleasures of the senses are transitory, abiding in the first state of contemplation is not. The first state of contemplation is that in which the thinker has concentrated the attention on some topic that is investigated analytically and discursively. It is the state of mind of a careful and methodical thinker.
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 28: “Taṅ ca Tathāgato pajānāti, tato ca uttaritaram pajānāti, tan ca pajānanam ṅa parāmasati, aparāmasato c’ assa paccattam yeva nibbuti viditā, vedanānam samudayaṅ ca atthagamaṅ ca assādaṅ ca ādīnavaṅ ca nissaranan ca yathā-bhūtam viditvā anupādā vimutto, bhikkhave, Tathāgato. Ime kho te, bhikkhave, dhammā gambhīrā duddasā…” etc., as in n. 12 above.
Rahula 1959, p. 2
This formula is very frequently recited in the Agama literature. In order to deemphasize the overtones of fulsome praise usually given this passage, I have deliberately translated it in a way much more prosaic than its customary treatment For those who would like to compare my treatment with a more standard one, the original text as it appears in Morris (1885 ed., p. 180) is given here, along with the rendering of Woodward. The Pāli reads: “…so Bhagavā araharh sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṅasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathi satthā devamanussānam Buddho Bhagavā. So imam lokam sadevakam samārakam sabrahmakam sassamanabrahmanim pajam sadevamanussam sayam abhinnā sacchikatvā pavedeti.” Woodward (1960 tr., p. 163) translates: “‘It is he, that Arahant who is a Fully Awakened One, perfect in knowledge and in practice, Wellfarer, world-knower, unsurpassed charioteer of men to be tamed, teacher of devas and of mankind, a Buddha, an Exalted One. He makes known this world together with the world of devas, Māras and Brahmas, together with the host of recluses and brāhmins, both of devas and mankind, having himself come to know it thoroughly for himself.’”
Morris 1885 ed., p. 189: “Alam hi vo Kālāmā kankhitum alam vicikicchitum. Kankhaniye va pana vo thāne vicikicchā uppannā. Etha tumhe Kālāmā mā anussavena mā paramparāya mā itikirāya mā pitakasampadānena mā takkahetu mā nayahetu mā ākāra-parivitakkena mā ditthinijjhānakkhantiyā mā bhavyarūpatāya mā samano no garū ti, yadā tumhe Kālāmā attanā va jāneyyathā-ime dhammā akusalā ime dhammā sāvajjā ime dhammā vinnugarahita ime dhammā samattā samādinnā ahitāya dukkhāya samvattanti ti—atha tumhe Kālāmā pajaheyyātha.”
Tredennick 1954 tr., pp. 7–8.
Dīgha Nikāya, Tevijja Sutta 36. Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 248.
Davids and Carpenter 1890 ed., p. 240.
Majjhima Nikāya, Bhayabheravasutta. See Trenckner 1887 ed., pp. 22–23. For an English translation, see Horner 1954 tr., pp. 28–29.
Trenckner 1887 ed., p. 482: “Ye te Vaccha evam āhamsu: samano Gotamo sabbannu sabbadassāvī, aparisesam nānadassanam paṭijānāti: carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgarassa ca satatam samitam nānadassanam paccupaṭṭhitan ti, na me te vuttavādino, abbhācikkhanti ca pana man te asatā abhūtenāti.”
Davids 1890 tr., p. 19, records the answer of the monk Nāgasena to King Milinda’s question as to why Buddhist monks shave the head. Nāgasena says: “A recluse shaves off his hair and beard on the recognition of the sixteen impediments therein to the higher life. And what are those sixteen? The impediments of ornamenting it, and decking it out, of putting oil upon it, of shampooing it, of placing garlands round it, of using scents and unguents, and myrobalan seeds, and dyes, and ribbons, and combs, of calling in the barber, of unravelling curls, and of the possibility of vermin. When their hair falls off they are grieved and harassed; yea, they lament sometimes, and cry, and beat their breasts, or fall headlong in a swoon--and entangled by these and such impediments men may forget those parts of wisdom or learning which are delicate and subtle.”
Cited in Reale 1985:312.
Cited in Reale 1985:311.
Cited in Reale 1985:316.
Cited in Reale 1985:324. For a further account of Pyrrho of Elis and how his thought was developed by Sextus Empiricus and other skeptics, see also Hallie 1967b and Popkin 1967, p. 450.
Burnyeat 1980:132–133.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1:1–2. Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p. 4: anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam yah pratītyasamutpādam prapancopaśamarti śivam deśayām āsa sambuddhas tarn vande vadatām varam
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 27:30 in Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p. 258: sarvadrstiprahānāya yah saddharmam adeśayat anukampām upādāya tam namasyāmi gautamam
Like the term “drsti,” the term “prapanca”, when used in the context of a Buddhist work is virtually devoid of any precise meaning. Both of these terms may be regarded as variables that are capable of being given a more or less precise meaning by the Buddhist who uses them. Despite being variables, they do have a constant feature, which is that every Buddhist uses these words to connote wrongful uses of the mind. So, whenever we encounter the terms in a given text, all we can know for sure is that they refer to mental habits that have to be got rid of if we are to attain the greatest good. As was stated above (p. 45), for some Buddhist thinkers, wrongful mental habits might consist in holding certain specified views that are contrary to the principal dogmas of institutionalized Buddhism. For others, a wrongful use of the intellect might consist in any sort of analytical thinking. For yet others, it might consist in naive, uncritical thinking. But in the usage of any given thinker, we can never be sure without further investigation just exactly what kinds of mental habits are seen as being impediments to our highest well-being. So in Nāgārjuna’s verses all we can know for sure, at least before doing a very thorough investigation of his text, is that the terms have undesirable overtones.
Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p.149: karmakleśaksayān moksah karmakleśa vikalpatah te prapancāt prapancas tu śūnyatāyām nirudhyate This verse is rendered somewhat differently by other translators. Streng (1967, p. 204) offers this: “On account of the destructions of the pains (kleśa) of action there is release; for pains of action exist for him who constructs them. These pains result from phenomenal extension (prapanca); but this phenomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.” Sprung (1979 tr., p. 171) renders the verse as follows: “From the wasting away of the afflictions and karmic action there is freedom. The afflictions and karmic action arise from the hypostatizing thought and this from the manifold of named things. Named things come to an end in the absence of being.” Kalupahana’s translation (1986 tr., p. 266), being considerably more simple, also has the virtue of not forcing a particular philosophical interpretation upon the reader: “On the waning of the defilements of action, there is release. Defilements of action belong to one who discriminates, and these in turn result from obsession. Obsession, in its turn, ceases within the context of emptiness.” In these different translations one can see some remarkably different interpretations of the term “prapanca” by modern translators. Note that Streng translates it as “phenomenal extension,” Sprung as “the manifold of named things” and Kalupahana as “obsession.” From these different translations it is apparent that there is not even agreement as to what general kind of thing prapanca is, such as whether it is an attitude or at least some kind of psychological state as Kalupahana’s “obsession” suggests, or whether it pertains to a representation of an object or to an object itself considered in its relationship to a cognizing subject. I am inclined to agree with Kalupahana that prapanca is a species of thinking. In the grammatical tradition prapanca is expatiation, and in particular it is a statement that elaborates the full meaning of a tersely stated rule. See Renou 1957:225. I believe that in Nāgārjuna’s usage it means something somewhat similar to that, namely, the tendency to build elaborated systems of theories; insofar as such elaboration is unnecessary for the task of attaining nirvana, since attaining nirvana is not a function of merely achieving a correct intellectual understanding of things, the tendency to indulge in theoretical expatiation (prapanca) upon basic opinions (drsti) may be seen as a type of vain, unnecessary and perhaps even distracted and thus counterproductive thinking. But my hunch on the meaning of the term “prapanca” as used by Nāgārjuna is not based upon enough familiarity with the entire Mūlamadhyamakakārikā to be worth much more man just an example of vain thinking itself.
Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p. 219: yah pratītyasamutpadah śūnyatām tām pracaksmahe sā prajnaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā Streng (1967, p. 213) renders this same verse: “The ‘originating dependently’ we call ‘emptiness’; This apprehension, i.e., taking into account [all other things], is the understanding of the middle way.” Sprung (1979, p. 238) renders it: “We interpret the dependent arising of all things as the absence of being in them. Absence of being is a guiding, not a cognitive, notion, presupposing the everyday. It is itself the middle way.” Again, Kalupahana’s translation is much more straightforward and contains less gratuitous philosophical sophistication: “We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path.”
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 25:24 in Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p.236: sarvopalambhopaśamah prapancopaśamah śivah na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitah Compare Strang’s translation (1967, p. 217): “The cessation of accepting everything [as real] is a salutary (śiva) cessation of phenomenal development (prapanca); No dharma has been taught by the Buddha of anything.” Sprung’s (1979, p. 262): “Ultimate beatitude is the coming to rest of all ways of taking things, the repose of named things; no Truth has been taught by a Buddha for anyone, anywhere.” Kalupahana (1986, p. 369) thinks it is wrong to treat the first line of the verse as a separate sentence from the second line. Rather, he thinks the words in the nominative case in the first line should be construed as modifying the word “dharmo” in the second line. Accordingly, he translates: “The Buddha did not teach the appeasement of all objects, the appeasement of obsession, and the auspicious as some thing to some one at some place.” The purpose of the passage, according to Kalupahana, is simply to state that freedom or nirvāna is not a substantial thing that the Buddha taught to someone.
The argument outlined here is essentially the one given in chapter 5 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 5:8 in Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p. 54: astitvam ye tu paśyanti nāstitvam cālpabuddhayah bhāvānām te na paśyanti drastavyam śivarh
Stcherbatsky 1932, p 10.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 25:19–20 in Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p. 234: na samsārasya nirvānāt kimcid asti viśesanam na nirvānasya samsārāt kimcid asti viśesanam nirvānasya ca yā kotih kotih samsaranasya ca na tayor antaram kimcit susūksmam api vidyate
Vigrahavyāvartanī 29–30 in Nāgārjuna 1951 ed., p. 127–128: yadi kācana pratijnā syān me tata esa me bhaved dosah nāsti ca mama pratijnā tasmān naivāsti me dosah yadi kimcid upalabheyam pravartayeyam nivartayeyam vā pratyaksādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me ‘nupālambhah In his own commentary to these verses, Nāgārjuna specifies the four criteria of knowledge (pramāna) that are intended by his phrase “sensation and so forth.” They are sensation (pratyaksa), reasoning (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and scriptural tradition (āgama).
The English word “criterion” is borrowed directly from the Greek word “kritērion,” signifying a standard that serves as a means of judging, which in turn derives from the verb “krinō,” meaning to divide, separate, discern, or decide. Also derived from this same verb are the Greek words from which the English “crisis” and “critical” are derived; a krisis in general was the process of making a decision, and in particular it was a legal trial, whereas a kritēs was a judge or umpire who had the quality of being kritikos, capable of making a sound judgement. Similarly, the Sanskrit term “pramāna” means a standard of measurement and was also used in legal situations to refer to the evidence that each party adduced to support its case. Stephen Toulmin (1958) in the chapters called “The layout of arguments” and “Working logic and idealised logic” makes a case for seeing the canons of proper evidence in a court of law, rather than the idealised systems of logic worked out by logicians, as the natural “logical theory” for most of our everyday reasoning. Toulmin’s suggestions, which were not made at all with reference to the philosophical situation in classical India, nevertheless apply very well to the Indian context. In general I think we may get further in our understanding of Indian epistemology if we see it as a kind of informal jurisprudence rather than as a species of formal logic. Certainly in the context of Nāgārjuna’s critique of the pramānas, given the similarity in not only basic meaning but also usage between the Greek term “kritērion” and the Sanskrit “pramāna” the English “criterion” makes a good translation of the Sanskrit term in its general usage. In certain contexts, which will be discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters, it may make more sense to translate it as “knowledge” or as “means of acquiring knowledge.”
Vigrahavyāvartanī 31–33 in Nāgārjuna 1951 ed., p. 128–129: yadi ca pramānatas te tesām tesām prasiddhir arthānām tesām punah prasiddhim brūhi katham te pramānānām anyair yadi pramānaih pramānasiddhir bhavet tadanavasthā nādeh siddhis tatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya tesām atha pramānair vinā prasiddhir vihīyate vādah vaisamikatvam tasmin viśesahetuś ca vaktavyah
A similar discussion occurs at Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 7:8–12.
Vigrahavyàvartanī 51 in Nāgārjuna 1951 ed., p. 138: naiva svatah prasiddhir na parasparatah parapramānair vā na bhavati na ca prameyair na cāpy akasmāt pramānānām
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 13:8 in Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p. 108: śūnyatā sarvadrstīnam proktā nihsaranam jinaih yesārh tu śūnyatā drstis tān asādhyān babhāsire
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24:11–12 in Nāgārjuna 1960 ed., p. 216: vināśayati durdrstā śūnyatā mandamedhasam sarpo yathā durgrhīto vidyā vā dusprasādhitā ataś ca pratyudāvrttam cittam deśayitum muneh dharmam matvāsya dharmasya mandair duravagāhatām
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Hayes, R.P. (1988). Rational Skepticism in Pre-Diṅnāgan Buddhism. In: Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs. Studies of Classical India, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2_2
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