Abstract
The relativist holds that in some crucial respect or other our cognitive abilities are simply too restricted or weak to determine our cognitive development. The essence of cognitive relativism is to deny that humans have access to methods for objectively criticising their own cognitive commitments; in particular, relativists argue the absence of critical methods which would transcend the conditions which produced those commitments. For example, it may be argued that theories are underdetermined by empirical experience and hence that there is no way to choose rationally among empirically equivalent theories and hence all knowledge claims are relative to the particular theoretical tradition within which they are made. Perhaps forces external to science itself may causally bring about a scientific revolution, but at least in the relativistic respects the revolution will not have been cognitively chosen, it will simply have been caused.
Wide is the gate and broad the way which leads to destruction, and many there be that travel that way.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Churchman, C. W. (1968) Challenge to Reason, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Churchman, C. W. (1972) The Design of Enquiring Systems, New York: Basic Books.
Devitt, M. (1984) Realism and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: The University Press.
Hahlweg, K. (1981) ‘Progress Through Evolution? An Inquiry into the Thought of C. H. Waddington’, Acta Biotheoretica 30 (1981), 103–120.
Hahlweg, K. (1983) ‘The Evolution of Science: A Systems Approach’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario.
Hooker, C. A. (1975a) ‘Global Theories’, Philosophy of Science 42 (1975), 152–179.
Hooker, C. A. (1975b) ‘Systematic Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy of Science: Empiricism, Popperianism and Realism’, Synthese 32 (1975), 177–231.
Hooker, C. A. (1982) ‘Understanding and Control’, Man-Environment Systems Vol. 12 Issue 4 (1982), 121–160.
Hooker, C. A. (1983) ‘The Future Must be a Fantasy’, in Chapman, R. J. K. (ed.), The Future, Public Policy Monograph, University of Tasmania, 1983.
Hooker, C. A. (1986a) A Realistic Theory of Science, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1986.
Hooker, C. A. (1986b) ‘Evolutionary Naturalist Realism — Circa 1985’, in Hooker 1986a.
Lewontin, R. C. (1978) ‘Adaptation’, Scientific American, Sept. 1978.
Lewontin, R. C. (1982) ‘Organism and Environment’ in Plotkin, H. C. (ed.), Learning Development and Culture, John Wiley & Sons, 151–170.
Munevar, G. (1981) Radical Knowledge, Indianapolis: Hackett.
Trigg, R. (1980) Reality at Risk: A Defense of Realism in Philosophy and the Sciences, Brighton, Sussex, Harvester Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Waddington, C. H. (1975) The Evolution of an Evolutionist, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hahlweg, K., Hooker, C.A. (1988). Evolutionary Epistemology and Relativism. In: Nola, R. (eds) Relativism and Realism in Science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7795-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2877-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive