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Introduction: Some Issues Concerning Relativism and Realism in Science

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Relativism and Realism in Science

Part of the book series: Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ((AUST,volume 6))

Abstract

Realism is an interpretation of scientific theories nearly as old as science itself. When Aristotle presented Eudoxus’ theory of nested concentric rotating spheres devised to account for the motions of the planets and stars, he assumed that it gave a picture of how the cosmos was actually constructed. His immediate successors were less sanguine about the possibility that any scientific theory, whether of concentric spheres or of combinations of epicycles and deferents, could provide us with such a picture at all. They were early instrumentalists who preferred to regard theories as devices whose task was only, as they put it, “to save the phenomena”. Realism and instrumentalism are rival views of science; a third rival is relativism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Auckland, New Zealand

    Robert Nola

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  1. Robert Nola
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, New Zealand

    Robert Nola

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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Nola, R. (1988). Introduction: Some Issues Concerning Relativism and Realism in Science. In: Nola, R. (eds) Relativism and Realism in Science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7795-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2877-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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