Abstract
This paper concerns the question of the significance of empirical evidence for developments in the foundations of decision theory. I will argue that a particular type of empirical findings is of crucial importance for how the theory develops. My position will thus be in sharp contrast to what I take to be the general view of the matter, i.e. that empirical findings have been and should be without significance for developments in the foundations of decision theory. In order to be able to outline more fully my aims and ideas a survey of the traditional theory of decision making, the Bayesian theory, is called for.
The author wishes to thank Peter Gärdenfors, Sören Halldén, Bengt Hansson and William L. Harper for helpful suggestions and discussion.
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Sahlin, NE. (1988). The Significance of Empirical Evidence for Developments in the Foundations of Decision Theory. In: Batens, D., Van Bendegem, J.P. (eds) Theory and Experiment. Synthese Library, vol 195. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2875-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2875-6_7
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