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The Significance of Empirical Evidence for Developments in the Foundations of Decision Theory

  • Nils-Eric Sahlin
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 195)

Abstract

This paper concerns the question of the significance of empirical evidence for developments in the foundations of decision theory. I will argue that a particular type of empirical findings is of crucial importance for how the theory develops. My position will thus be in sharp contrast to what I take to be the general view of the matter, i.e. that empirical findings have been and should be without significance for developments in the foundations of decision theory. In order to be able to outline more fully my aims and ideas a survey of the traditional theory of decision making, the Bayesian theory, is called for.

Keywords

Decision Theory Traditional Theory Decision Situation Bayesian Theory Independence Axiom 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nils-Eric Sahlin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversitySweden

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