Abstract
Not surprisingly, I do not agree with Ellery Eells that in his example “C is causally neutral for E.” I do agree that C “doesn’t affect the chance of E’s occurring,” nevertheless I think that it is a true causal “law” in Eells’ constructed universe that C’s cause E’s. It is also a true law that C’s prevent E’s. His example resembles in this respect the version of Hesslow’s example in which the contraceptives both cause and prevent thrombosis although, all-told, they leave the probabilities unaffected.
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Dupré, John and Cartwright, Nancy (1986) ‘Probabilistic capacities and probabilistic laws’. Manuscript (Stanford University: Stanford, Cal.).
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Cartwright, N. (1988). Reply to Ellery Eells. In: Skyrms, B., Harper, W.L. (eds) Causation, Chance and Credence. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2863-3_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2863-3_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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