Abstract
In his ‘Moral Rights and Causal Casuistry’, Professor Eric Mack articulates a theory of what he calls ‘causal casuistry’ that he labels ‘restrictive’.1 One of the central principles of Mack’s ‘restrictive’ view of causality is the ‘Causing versus Allowing Principle’ (hereafter, ‘CA’) according to which ‘there is a morally significant difference between causing a death and allowing a death’ ([10], p. 59). I shall argue that CA is false and that the view of causality articulated by Professor Mack disguises the richness and complexity of what we do or fail to do.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Gruzalski, B.K. (1988). Death by Omission. In: Brody, B.A. (eds) Moral Theory and Moral Judgments in Medical Ethics. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 32. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2715-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2715-5_7
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