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Economic Power and the Political Process

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Book cover Market Power and the Economy

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 15))

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Abstract

This chapter is an essay in political economy—specifically, the political economy of power. It is an examination of how the “Golden Rule of Politics” (cited above) really works. It is, therefore, an exploration of the impact of economic power on political processes.

Economics as a separate science is unrealistic, and misleading if taken as a guide in practice, his one element—a very important element, it is true—in a wider study, the science of power.—Bertrand Russell

The Golden Rule of Politics—he who has the gold, rules.—Mark Green

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Notes

  1. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983), pp. 113–114.

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  45. This point is made cogently in Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 129–130.

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  76. Ibid., p. 6.

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Authors
  1. Jerry L. Petr
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA

    Wallace C. Peterson

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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Petr, J.L. (1988). Economic Power and the Political Process. In: Peterson, W.C. (eds) Market Power and the Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2673-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2673-8_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7705-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2673-8

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