Abstract
Consider a production manager who is hired by a firm to ensure that daily operations run smoothly and efficiently. The manager receives intermediate cost reports during each month for control purposes, and is evaluated on the basis of monthly summary cost reports. The manager may wish to adjust his or her daily control effort based on the information in the intermediate cost reports.
This paper is based on part of the author’s Ph.D. dissertation at the University of British Columbia. Special thanks are due to Gerald Feltham, who supervised the dissertation, for his comments and discussions related to the dissertation and for his detailed comments on this paper. Thanks are also due to John Butterworth for discussions related to the dissertation, and to Kam-Wah Tsui for his comments on this paper. The research was partially supported by the Research Center for Managerial Economics and Public Policy at the University of California, Los Angeles.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
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Matsumura, E.M. (1988). Sequential Choice Under Moral Hazard. In: Feltham, G.A., Amershi, A.H., Ziemba, W.T. (eds) Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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